Environmental Land-Use Control: Common Law and Statutory Approaches by Ripley, Wayne E., Jr. et al.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 28 Number 1 Article 7 
10-1-1973 
Environmental Land-Use Control: Common Law and Statutory 
Approaches 
Wayne E. Ripley Jr. 
Eric Cohen 
John R. Dwyer Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Wayne E. Ripley Jr., Eric Cohen, and John R. Dwyer Jr., Environmental Land-Use Control: Common Law 
and Statutory Approaches, 28 U. Miami L. Rev. 135 (1973) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol28/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
COMMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL LAND-USE CONTROL: COMMON LAW
AND STATUTORY APPROACHES
WAYNE E. RIPLEY, JR.,* ERIC COHEN** & JOHN R. DWYER, JR.***
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 136
II. TRADITIONAL LAND-USE CONTROL DEVICES .................................... 138
A. Common Law Approaches-Judicial Reconciliation of Discordant Land Use.. 138
1. VOLUNTARY RESTRICTIONS ............................................. 138
2. NUISANCE .......................................................... 138
a. Public N uisance .................................................. 139
b. Private N uisance ................................................ 141
3. TRESPASS ........................................................... . 144
4. NON-INTENTIONAL INVASIONS OF THE USE AND' ENJOYMENT OF LAND ........ 146
a. Strict Liability .................................................. 146
b. N egligence ...................................................... 147
5. RIPARIAN RIGHTS .................................................... 149
6. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE .......................................... 151
7. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 152
B. Traditional Statutory Land-Use Control Devices .......................... 153
1. FACTORS AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF LAND-USE CONTROL STATUTES ........ 153
2. ZONING ............................................................ 155
3. OPEN SPACE ZONING .................................................. 159
4. SUBDIVISION CONTROLS AND EXACTIONS ................................. 161
S. PERM ITS ............................................................ 163
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 164
III. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ............................................. 164
A. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) .................. 165
1. PURPOSE OF THE ACT ................................................. '165
2. WHEN MUST AN IMPACT STATEMENT BE FILED? ......................... 167
a. What Constitutes Federal Action? ................................. 167
b. Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the Quality of the Human
Environm ent .................................................... 168
3. STANDING TO SUE UNDER NEPA ........................................ 171
4. COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING HOUSING .................................. 178
5. CONTENTS OF THE IMPACT STATEMENT ................................. 181
a. R ules ........................................................... 181
b. Case Law ....................................................... 181
c. Who Must Prepare the Statement ................................. 182
6. PROBLEM S OF NEPA .................................................. 183
B. Other Federal Laws .................................................... 185
1. POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS ............................................ 185
2. LAND PLANNING LAW ................................................. 187
IV. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AFFECTING LAND USE .......................... 188
A. California Follows NEPA (CEQA) ...................................... 188
1. INITIAL PROBLEM S ................................................... 188
2. THE AMENDED CEQA ................................................. 193
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Student Instructor
in Freshman Research and Writing.
** Student Writing Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Student Instructor in
Freshman Research and Writing.
*** Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
135
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
B. Florida's Regulatory Problem ........................................... 195
1. THE FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL LAND AND WATER MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972.. 196
2. ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA ACT ........................................ 199
C. Significant Developments in Other States ................................. 201
V. NATIONAL LAND USE MANAGEMENT-A NEW APPROACH ........................... 204
VI. CONCLUIiON ............................................................... 207
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental quality control is an accepted concept today. In the
sixties, the public demanded pollution abatement, and Congress re-
sponded by passing laws in the early seventies. The result was the crea-
tion of the Council on Environmental Quality,1 the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency2 and the passage of federal laws designed to abate air8
and water pollution.' In spite of pressure from special interest groups,
and warnings that industry cannot afford to comply with the clean air
and water standards, the environmental quality movement has generated
enough support to ensure enforcement of the standards without material
compromise.
On its face, the legislative scheme seems to provide the necessary
basis for preserving the environment. However, there is a growing aware-
ness that one important link is missing in the chain: a land regulation
scheme.
Control of both air and water pollution depends on land control to
a great degree. Evidence of this is presented by present clean air regula-
tions which control the placement of shopping centers and other public
attractions if the consequential increase in traffic would cause a violation
of the air quality standards.' The effects of land use on water quality are
equally obvious. Erosion, fertilizer and animal excretion runoff, sewage
disposal, and destruction of the aquifer are examples of how improper
land use is tied into water pollution.
Apart from its effect on air and water pollution, the improper use of
land can cause environmental degradation in the form of the destruction
of aesthetic quality.' Although the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that there is a fundamental right to aesthetic quality, the
Court requires a showing of injury in fact in order to have standing to
sue.7 However, there is no federal law which recognizes this right in the
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) [herein-
after cited as NEPA].
2. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086.
3. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
4. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.
(Supp. 1973).
5. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.493 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Magid, Environmental Law Symposium: Land Use, Aesthetics and the State
Legislature, 19 WAYNE L. Rav. 73 (1972).
7. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 U.S. 1361 (1972).
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public." Thus, absent specific statutory provisions 9 a citizen may be
legally powerless to stop a federal agency or private developer from the
pursuit of economic gain destroying the land's beauty. The problem is
particularly crucial because, unlike the effects of water pollution, the
destruction of the aesthetic uniqueness and beauty of the land cannot be
reversed.'
There is a great need for a revitalized land ethic in this country.
We need to develop a system of values which places proper emphasis on
man's need to live with his environment. As Stuart Udall wrote in his
book, The Quiet Crisis:11
We cannot afford an America where expedience tramples upon
aesthetics and development decisions are made with an eye
only on the present.
Henry Thoreau would scoff at the notion that the Gross
National Product should be the chief index to the state of the
nation, or that automobile sales or figures on consumer con-
sumption reveal anything significant about the authentic art
of living. He would surely assert that a clean landscape is as
important as a freeway, he would deplore every planless con-
quest of the countryside, and he would remind his country-
men that a glimpse of grouse can be more inspiring than a
Hollywood spectacular or color television. To those who com-
plain of the complexity of modern life, he might reply, "If
you want inner peace find it in solitude, not speed, and if you
would find yourself, look to the land from which you came and
to which you go.'
2
8. It has been argued that section 4331 of NEPA gives all citizens the right to a clean
and healthful environment. This argument has been rejected in all cases so far. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Tanner
v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,
344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. vacated, 409 U.S. 1021 (1973).
9. A 1970 Michigan act permits the designation of county roads as "Natural Beauty
Roads." Once so designated, the vegatation around such roads cannot be altered. MIcH.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 247.381-.385 (Supp. 1971).
Another example is presented by two identical federal statutes which say that,
the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve any program or project which
requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park . . . unless (1)
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such
program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park . . . result-
ing from such use.
23 U.S.C. § 138; 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
10. "Environmentalists recognize that improper use of land 'is now one of the most
serious and difficult challenges to environmental quality because it is the most out-of-hand,
and irreversible.'" Magid, Environmental Law Symposium: Land Use, Aesthetics and the
State Legislature, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 73, 75 (1972), citing CovcN. oN ENVIRONmENTAL
QuA=rr', FmST ANsruAL REPoRT 165 (1970).
11. UDA.., THE QuIET Cgisis (1963).
12. Id. at 202.
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This paper deals with the connexity between land use and the en-
vironment. Section II deals with the common law and traditional ap-
proach to the problems of land use. Section III deals with the impact
of federal laws on the use of the land, section IV shows how some states
have recently dealt with the problem by adopting new approaches based
on the federal laws, and section V discusses new proposals for federal
land use management.
The reader should discover that none of the approaches outlined
above have really worked. The authors feel that the answer to the land
use problem lies somewhere in the maze of all the laws, rules and regu-
lations to be discussed. We hope that by presenting an analysis of the
various regulatory schemes, we can contribute to the solution of the most
basic problem facing America today.
II. TRADITIONAL LAND-USE CONTROL DEVICES
Ours is a civilization based upon private ownership. It is, therefore,
a socially desirable policy that each person be allowed to use his own
land as he sees fit. This tenet of the American credo has become obsolete
because it discouraged responsible and far-sighted land use, although it
is occasionally reverently recited by a court preparing to further restrict
property rights.'" Restrictions of property rights are not a recent develop-
ment, but merely the inevitable result of increasing population density.
This section will briefly examine the more traditional forms of land-use
control devices, both ancient and modern, common law and statutory.
A. Common Law Approaches-Judicial Reconciliation
of Discordant Land Use
1. VOLUNTARY RESTRICTIONS
The common law arsenal of land-use control devices includes sev-
eral voluntary devices: covenants running with the land, equitable servi-
tudes, easements, profits a prendre, defeasible fees and licenses. While
the existence of such restrictions is of great interest to the developer,
both as a cloud on title and as a planning device for subdivision, they
are of slight environmental importance and merit no further discussion.
2. NUISANCE
"['Nuisance'] has meant all things to all men .... ""4 Public and
private nuisance are two distinct concepts which unfortunately bear the
13. E.g. "There is no doubt of the general proposition that a man may do what he will
with his own [property], but .... ." Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1897)
(emphasis added).
14. W. PROSSER, TORTS 592 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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same label and which have come to share certain characteristics.' 5 The
term "nuisance" has reference to the interest invaded, not to the type
of act causing the disturbance,16 although there have been numerous at-
tempts to distinguish nuisance from strict liability or negligence 7 on the
basis of the defendant's actions. While nuisance is generally committed
by misuse of the defendant's land, occasional cases involve actions un-
related to the defendant's use of land. 8 The areas of public and private
nuisance will be discussed separately, with common factors treated under
public nuisance.
a. Public Nuisance
Unlike private nuisance, which is an invasion of the rights of use
and enjoyment of a person's land, public nuisance involves an action
which injures the "safety, health or morals... or works some substantial
annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the public." 9 Typically, these are
statutory offenses involving "immoral" business or actions,20 but pollu-
tion or other actions which are not statutory infractions may be public
nuisances if harmful to the general welfare.'
The actions for public nuisance, which also create criminal liability,
may normally be brought only by the proper governmental authorities.
2
1
By statute, Florida allows citizens to sue in the name of the state23 to
enjoin enumerated statutory nuisances, without requesting permission
1S. Id. at 592-94. See generally McRae, Development of Nuisance in the Early Common
Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948).
16. Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944); PROSSER, supra note
14, at 594; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oi TORTS, Scope and Introductory Note ch. 40 (1965).
17. E.g., 23 FLA. JuR. Nuisances § 4 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Note, Sound Amplifiers Reconsidered, 2 U. FLA. L. Rav. 257 (1949).
19. City of Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 83, 79 So. 476, 477 (1918); Federal Amuse-
ment Co. v. State, 159 Fla. 495, 32 So. 2d 1 (1947). See FLA. STAT. § 823.01 (1971). The
Supreme Court has recognized a federal common law public nuisance. Illinois v. Milwaukee,
92 S. Ct. 1385 (1972), overruling without mentioning Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch,
125 U.S. 1 (1887).
20. E.g., Federal Amusement Co. v. State, 159 Fla. 495, 32 So. 2d 1 (1947) (female
impersonators); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So, 801 (1927). "It
rests ...within the province of the legislative body, to prescribe what shall constitute a
nuisance, and ... the Legislature . ..may make that a nuisance which was not one at
common law." Id. at 441, 111 So. at 810. See generally PROSSER, supra note 14, at 603-05.
However, a legal nuisance must be one in fact, although the legislative determination is
given great weight. City of Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 368 (1893).
21. E.g., Lakeland v. State, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940) (sewage discharge); Bart-
lett v. Moats, 120 Fla. 563, 23 So. 2d 727 (1935) (noise) ; Miami v. Coral Gables, 233 So.
2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (smoke).
22. E.g., Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919).
Although equity normally cannot enjoin a crime, the state may both prosecute and seek to
suppress the nuisance in equity. Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State, 93 Fla. 415, Ill So. 801
(1927).
23. FLA. STAT. § 60.05 (1971). See also WIs. STAT. § 280.02 (1958). Other states allow
private action where various "immoral" nuisances are involved. E.g., MONT. RPv. CODE
§ 94-1003 (1969)
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from or after the refusal of state officials to seek injunction.2 4 The same
act may constitute both a private and a public nuisance. However, a
private individual must show special damage, differing in kind, not merely
degree, from the injury to the public in order to maintain an action for
the public nuisance.25 This requirement protects a defendant, whose
actions would create public nuisance liability, from a large number of
potential plaintiffs.2
Nuisances, both public and private, are often described as being
"absolute" or "per se" and, therefore, are found to be nuisances without
regard to the care exercised by the defendant or the circumstances sur-
rounding the caseY.2 These nuisances typically are statutory, 2s clearly un-
reasonable in light of the surroundings, or abnormal and unduly hazard-
ous. However, nuisances "per accidens," the most common type, re-
quire an investigation into the attendant circumstances.8"
To be actionable, both public and private nuisances must involve
substantial interference with the interest invaded. 8' Thus, most cases
will necessarily involve continuing behavior82 which is offensive or harm-
ful to a person of ordinary sensibilities."
There are numerous defenses to public nuisance suits, including
all normal equitable defenses. It may be argued that there is no nuisance
24. Merry-Go-Round, Inc. v. State, 136 Fla. 278, 186 So. 538 (1939).
25. Bair v. Central & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1962); Page v.
Niagara Chemical Div., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953); Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59
Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910) (fence across public highway blocked passage from hotel to
railroad depot). Ironically, the more widespread and severe the harm, the less likely private
action will be maintainable. See generally Prosser, Private Actions For Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REV. 997 (1966); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1381 (1955).
26. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *166.
27. Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1381, 1388 (1955).
28. See note 20 supra. The legislature can also authorize behavior which would other-
wise be a nuisance. See National Container Corp. v. State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939).
However, such authorization may be the basis for inverse condemnation if the damage is so
severe as to be a non-physical taking of property. See generally Comment, Nuisance-As a
"Taking" oj Property, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 537 (1963). Also, it has been held that a statute
authorizing pollution of a river did not prevent private suit. Hodges v. Buckeye Cellulose
Corp., 174 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1965).
29. See section II, A, 4, a, infra.
30. E.g., Knowles v. Central Allapattae Properties, Inc., 145 Fla. 123, 198 So. 819 (1940).
31. Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938). This of course does not apply to
statutory public nuisances, where the maxim, "de tninimis non curat lex," is inapplicable.
32. E.g., Burnette v. Rushton, 52 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1951). There may be instantaneous
substantial harm which is actionable, as in E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffler, 139
F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943) (single failure of pollution control device).
33. Grentner v. Le Jeune Auto Theatre, 85 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1952) (auto theater hyper-
sensitive to neighboring light). Thus aesthetics alone will rarely sustain the action. Anderson
v. Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917). But see Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785 (Fla,
1954) (depression from cemetery); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953) (exercise
of legislative power). See generally Note, Aesthetic Nuisances in Florida, 14 U. FiA. L. REV.
54 (1962). It is no defense that there are worse offenders, and the violation of a pollution
control ordinance is admissible as evidence of the existence of a nuisance in fact. Miami v.
Coral Gables, 223 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
COMMENT
in fact, the harm not being substantial. 4 Or it may be that the govern-
ment has acquiesced or consented to actions involving large outlays of
time and money, so that injunction would be inequitable.8" Although the
government can declare certain acts not to be nuisances, the public nui-
sance action, unlike the private, cannot be defeated by prescription."
The public nuisance remedy has too often been ineffective in en-
vironmental cases, not because of inherent faults, but because the public
officials have been unable or unwilling to use the tools available," few
states having private enforcement statutes such as Florida's.
b. Private Nuisance
Private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of
another's land, generally by misuse of the defendant's land.18 Unlike
trespass, it involves no physical entry and creates no liability without
substantial harm.8" As compared to non-statutory public nuisance, it
affects fewer persons; the difference is largely a question of scope of
harm rather than of the nature of the act.4
Private nuisance has perhaps been the most utilized of all the com-
mon law tools against pollution, yet it has severe shortcomings. First,
it can be brought only by one having some interest in the property sub-
stantially affected by the nuisance.41
A second difficulty in private nuisance suits is in establishing proxi-
mate causation. While this hurdle may be relatively simple to overcome
in the single source situation,42 it is obviously more difficult where there
34. Miami Beach v. Texas Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368 (1940).
35. See note 28 supra. However, the operation must be as inoffensive as practically pos-
sible. See National Container Corp. v. State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939) (constitutional
provision). See generally Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 CoLum. L. REv.
781 (1952). The defense is especially likely where statutory tolerance levels exceed those of
the common law, as for aircraft noise. Kramon, Noise Control: Traditional Remedies and
a Proposal for Federal Action, 7 HARv. J. LEGIS. 533, 541 (1970).
36. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
37. See Hill, The Politics of Air Pollution; Public Interest and Pressure Groups, 10
ARIz. L. Rxv. 37 (1968).
38. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1956). See generally McRae, Development
of Nuisance in the Common Law, 1 U. FA. L. Rav. 27 (1948).
39. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1956); RESTATEMNT OF TORTS, Intro-
duction to ch. 40 (1939). Evidently, this is because the law does not concern itself with
petty annoyances and reflects the balancing of the competing interests in the use of plain-
tiff's and defendant's land.
40. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Introduction to ch. 40 (1939); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1381,
1390 (1955). See notes 25 & 26 suPra and accompanying text. The distinction may be a
remnant of the earlier policy of limiting liability to protect germinal industries.
41. The interest (and proportionate recovery) can be very small. McClosky v. Martin,
56 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1951) (tenant for a term) ; Brink v. Moeschl Edwards Corrugating Co.,
142 Ky. 88, 133 S.W. 1147 (1911) (adverse possession without title). However, it must
qualify as a property right. Elliot v. Mason, 76 N.H. 229, 81 A. 701 (1911) (licensee denied
recovery).
42. Lay evidence is admissible and can be sufficient to establish causation. Alton Box
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are many defendants, a common occurrence in pollution suits. Although
the existence of even more serious offenders is no defense,4" the burden
of rough apportionment of the damage is usually on the plaintiff.44 The
burden of division is occasionally placed upon the defendant;4" this
should also be done in cases of negligent nuisance 46 in states which fol-
low such a rule47 in negligence actions.
Third, the decisive consideration in many cases, the act must be
"unreasonable" in light of the circumstances and location,48 a judicial
recognition of the competing interests of the landowner and society.49
The plaintiff in a nuisance suit normally, in addition to damages, is
seeking to have the injurious acts stopped or prevented.50
The fourth broad defect in the private nuisance suit is that, assum-
ing the plaintiff can prove his cases, there is a substantial possibility
that damages will be allowed but injunctive relief denied. First, as with
all injunctions, irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law must
be shown. 1 Next, the plaintiff must hurdle the normal equitable de-
fenses52 and others. 8 Finally, the major pitfall in actions against indus-
Board Co. v. Pantya, 236 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Lee v. Florida Public Utilities
Co., 145 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). The burden can also be met by showing that the
interference commenced only with the use. Richards v. Village of Edinburg, 97 Ill. App. 2d
36, 239 N.E.2d 479 (1968).
43. E.g., Miami v. Coral Gables, 233 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Lakeland v. State,
143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940).
44. E.g., O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949); Sam Finley,
Inc. v. Waddell, 207 Va. 602, 151 S.E.2d 347 (1969). Independent polluters may be jointly
liable where practical division is impossible. Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48
N.W. 1000 (1891) (smoke unreasonable only when combined); Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57
Md. 1 (1881) (pollution unreasonable only when combined); Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153
Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931) (cattle poisoned by oil).
45. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
46. See section II, A, 4, b infra.
47. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); cf. Atkinson v. Herington
Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968) (joint liability for independent causes of
single injury).
48. See Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1956); Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial
Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 440; Note, Zoning Ordinances
and Common-Law Nuisance, 16 SYRACUsE L. REV. 860 (1965).
49. "'Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty village.'" Waschak
v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 452-53, 109 A.2d 310, 316 (1954) (Musmanno, J.) (original em-
phasis), quoting Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 Pitt. Leg. J. 379
(1935).
50. Relief from threatened nuisance requires proof of a high degree of real and apparent
danger of injury, practically that the operation will be a nuisance per se or necessarily a
nuisance. See National Container Corp. v. State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939) ; Faulkner v.
Brookfield, 368 Mich. 17, 117 N.W.2d 125 (1962). Useful evidence might be available from
the records of suits to enjoin similar operating nuisances which have failed because of the
comparative injury doctrine. See notes 55-63 infra and accompanying text.
51. Gibson v. Tampa, 114 Fla. 619, 154 So. 842 (1934).
52. See generally de Funiak, Equitable Relief Against Nuisance, 38 Ky. L.J. 223 (1950);
Walsh, Equitable Relief Against Nuisance, 7 N.Y.U.L. REV. 352 (1930).
53. Florida rejects the "coming to the nuisance" defense against injunction. Lawrence v.
Eastern Airlines Inc., 81 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1955). But see State ex rel. Knight v. Miami, 53
So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1951) (apparently considered in determination of reasonableness and exis-
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trial polluters, injunction may be denied under the comparative injury
or "balancing of the equities" doctrine.54 Not all courts follow the doc-
trine; early courts apparently paid little mind to the possibility of sub-
stantial injury to the wrongful defendant by the injunction, being more
concerned with preventing multiplicity of actions.55 Some courts went
so far as to ignore great economic loss to the community,56 although the
growth of industry tended to engender the courts' protectionism.
The great majority of courts do indeed "balance the equities," con-
sidering the possible benefit to plaintiff and harm to defendant,57 as well
as the effect upon the public. 8 It is unrealistic to expect a court to close
down large facilities operating as inoffensively as possible.5" Yet the
plaintiff may suffer truly severe loss from the misuse of his neighbor's
land."0 One approach has been to create a servitude by payment for the
loss from the continued nuisance.6" Of more benefit to the public would
be the use of a conditional injunction, requiring the offender to meet the
maximum feasible reduction of harm over a period of time. 2
Although the private nuisance suit has these definite limitations, it
is advantageous as compared to other common law remedies in several
tence of nuisance). See generally Comment, Torts: Defense of Coming to a Nuisance, 9 U.
FIA. L. REV. 228 (1956). However, prescription is apparently available as a complete de-
fense. E.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
54. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 601 (1971).
55. See Bristol v. Palmer, 83 Vt. 54, 74 A. 332 (1909); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 924 (1929);
Annot., 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 888 (1911).
56. E.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911);
see Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 NAT. REs. LAW. 475 (1970).
57. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1956).
58. Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 393 Ill. 367, 66 N.E.2d 391 (1946) (essential
war production); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83
S.W. 658 (1904). The injunction unsuccessfully sought in Ducktown would have closed a
plant worth $2 million, put 10,000 people out of work, and destroyed half of the county
tax base to protect land worth $1,000.
59. The chancellor is given wide discretion and should consider all of the facts and cir-
cumstances. Seaboard All-Florida Ry. v. Underhill, 105 Fla. 409, 141 So. 306 (1932);
Milling v. Berg, 104 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). Few go beyond the weighing of capital
investment and job total. It has been suggested that the demand for injunction largely is
used only to increase the recovery. Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18
TEXAS L. REV. 412, 420 (1940).
60. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (plain-
tiff's land value decreased 50%-$185,000). Boomer was followed by a deluge of criticism
of what was characterized as private condemnation. See, e.g., Coleman, Possible Repercus-
sions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 on Private Law Governing Pollution
Abatement Suits, 4 NAT. R s. LAW. 647, 651-52 (1970); Note, Judicial Grant of Easement
to Pollute-An Unwelcome Precedent for New York Environmental Law, 35 ALBANY L.
REV. 148 (1970); Comment, Injunctive Relief Denied in Private Action for Nuisance Caused
by Industrial Polluter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 919 (1970).
61. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). This is the
approach normally used where the tortfeasor is a public activity.
62. Id. at 231, 257 N.E.2d at 877 (dissenting opinion); cf. National Container Corp. v.
State, 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (1939). The standard to be used will present problems, as it
may create a class of polluters who will stifle efforts to develop pollution control methods
which might operate to cleanse below the set standard. Yet a strict standard may place the
defendant at a competitive disadvantage under the case-by-case approach of common law.
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ways. The statute of limitations is often longer than for other actions;6 3
recovery can be had for psychic and emotional injury without a "touch-
ing; "I4 and it may be the only basis for recovery in aircraft noise cases
for flights above the Civil Aeronautics Board minimums.6" The private
or public nuisance suit remains a viable and useful land-use control
device"6 despite the proliferation of statutory restrictions. 7
3. TRESPASS
The ancient tort of trespass is occasionally alleged in environmental
litigation. The suit has several attractive features growing from the need
to show only an intentional, unprivileged entry, as compared with the
unreasonable conduct and substantial injury requirements in a nuisance
action. s
The early common law rule of strict liability, including intrusions
neither negligent nor intended," has been replaced by the prevailing
position that liability will be found for intentional trespass, negligence,
or "abnormally dangerous" activity. 0 The intent required is merely that
to bring about the act which produces the invasion, not to cause the
harm7l-but this includes consequential results not intended although
substantially certain to follow.72 However, as this intent requirement
is generally thought of as involving some affirmative, volitional act,78 and
63. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1971) (4 years for nuisance and negligence, versus 3 for
trespass).
64. E.g., Jones v. Trawick, 75 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1954) (depression from cemetery).
65. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
66. See generally Comment, Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46
WASH. L. REV. 47 (1970).
67. Some concurrently applicable anti-pollution statutes preclude the private nuisance
suit, although in other jurisdictions the private action has been allowed in spite of the
statutes. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Martin, 337 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1964); Renken v.
Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Ore. 1963).
68. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 158 (1934).
69. E.g., Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123 (1876). See generally Clark, Trespass Quare
Clausum Fregit, 12 ALA. L. REV. 301 (1960).
70. Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, an
unintentional and non-negligent entry on land . . . or causing a thing . . . to enter
the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor even though the
entry caused harm ....
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965). See Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 524 (1872); Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1956); National Coal Bd.
v. J.C. Evans Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 861.
71. But see Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966). Another definition
includes intent to cause the harm, that the harm is substantially certain to result, or that
the defendant had knowledge of the interference. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
72. Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956) (water supply
fouled by slag run-off); Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1956). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13, comment d (1939); De Muth, A Comparison of the Conduct
Required in Trespass to Chattels and Negligence, 33 RocKY MT. L. REv. 323 (1961).
73. E.g., Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cty. 1961), aff'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Div. 1962) (no liability
for crash of plane out of control).
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because of the early exemption from liability for involuntary invasions,7 4
the intent requirement raises a possible defense in pollution cases. Many
cases involving only an escape of oil, gas, smoke or other pollutants,
might permit the defendant to argue that the escape is an involuntary
act creating no liability.75
The old distinction between direct or immediate versus indirect or
consequential injury in trespass and case7" has also faded under code
pleading. The trend is clearly to define trespass to include both direct
and indirect invasions of a person's protected interest in real property. 77
However, the distinction may still be useful as a defense by stressing
the need for a "direct" physical entry by some tangible object.7S Thus,
many courts have held that the invasion by invisible industrial dust or
noxious fumes is insufficient for trespass;79 but the trend is to allow re-
covery where harm is caused by even microscopic gases and particles.
Trespass is defined as
any intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest
in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or
invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured
only by the mathematical language of the physicist."0
Similarly, the requirement of "direct" injury can provide a loophole for
holding that the intervention of wind or water makes the invasion in-
direct and outside the scope of trespass."' More recent cases refuse this
tenuous distinction.
8 2
Trespass offers other advantages. It requires no proof of actual dam-
74. E.g., Smith v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (carried onto land against will);
Carter v. Thurston, 58 N.H. 104 (1877) (logs carried onto land by stream).
75. E.g., Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E. 2d 249 (1954) (oil leakage
from tank). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 7, Scope Note to Topic 2, at 300
(1965): "[A]ny intrusion of foreign matter which, although not intended, is a legal con-
sequence of a tortious act is here regarded as a trespass." See section II, A, 4, infra.
76. See generally B. SHIPmAN, COMMON-LAw PLEADING 70-73 (1923).
77. See, e.g., Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore.
1959); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 158, comment i (1965); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution
Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUxE L.J. 1127, 1139-42; Note, A Trend
Toward Coalescence of Trespass and Nuisance: Remedy for Invasion of Particulates, 1961
WASH. U.L.Q. 62.
78. This has been successful with many courts. See Note, Deposit of Gaseous and In-
visible Solid Industrial Wastes Held to Constitute Trespass, 60 COLuM. L. REv. 877 (1960).
79. E.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954), aff'd,
236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957) (fumes) ; Riblet v. Spokane-
Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 764, 778
(1957).
80. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 94, 342 P.2d 790, 794 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960). The reference to energy could perhaps open the door to suits
for trespass by light, X-ray, microwave and other forms of energy. But see Amphitheatres,
Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948) (light).
81. E.g., Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954), aff'd,
236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
82. Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co., 372 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1967).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
age, nominal damages being recoverable for even beneficial invasions."8
Of course, compensatory damages, including immediate personal injur-
ies,84 are recoverable, as are exemplary damages in aggravated situa-
tions. 85 Injunction is available in proper cases involving irreparable in-
jury and inadequate legal remedy, 6 common in pollution cases. The tres-
pass statute of limitations may be longer than for nuisance or other ac-
tions.87 Although both trespass and nuisance actions may be defeated
by prescriptive rights,8 8 trespass traditionally has had the advantage of
not being burdened with the "balancing of the equities"89 common in
nuisance.
4. NON-INTENTIONAL INVASIONS OF THE USE
AND ENJOYMENT OF LAND
a. Strict Liability
In a return to the form, if not the reasoning, of early common law,"°
certain acts may create liability totally without "fault."'" Of course, tres-
pass at one time was purely strict liability in nature;9 2 nuisance law has
overtones of this view. 3 In reality, strict liability is but one prong of
each of these torts.94
83. See, e.g., Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Rutledge, 122 Fla. 154, 165 So. 563 (1935);
Leonard v. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 122 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966). Of course,
such a recovery would merely be a Pyrrhic victory in pollution control.
84. Leonard v. Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 122 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
85. Hutchinson v. Courtney, 86 Fla. 556, 98 So. 582 (1923). Such aggravating elements
include malice, oppression and fraud.
86. Carney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893).
87. See, e.g., Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore.
1959). But see FrA. STAT. § 95.11(5) (b) (1971), setting 3 years for trespass, 4 years for
negligence and nuisance.
88. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights,
1967 DUXE L.J. 1126, 1142 (1967). However, the pollution might also constitute a public
nuisance, for which no prescriptive right may accrue. Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S.
659 (1878).
89. E.g., Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co., 372 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1967) (no right to
trespass despite high value). But see Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169
(D. Ore. 1963); Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954),
aff'd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
90. See Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability, 30 HARv. L. REV. 241 (1917); Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REV. 315 (1894).
91. See generally Faust, Strict Liability in Landowners' Cases, 42 ORE. L. REV. 273
(1963); Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REv.
233 (1968).
92. See notes 69 & 70 supra and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., E. Raub & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Schreffler, 139 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943).
Here, the single failure of a pollution control device resulted in liability with no proof of
negligence. The court reasoned that the creation of the possibility of a nuisance was in itself
an intentional act sufficient for liability.
Non-statutory "absolute" or "per se" nuisances are generally similar to strict liability in
nature. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 594. See Jost v. Dairyland Power Co-op., 45 Wis. 2d 164,
172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
94. See notes 69 & 70 supra and accompanying text (trespass); see PROSSER, supra note
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Excluding trespass, there are three theories of strict liability in the
land-use context. The first is that of "absolute" or "per se" nuisance, pre-
viously discussed." These terms are also applied to abnormal or ultra-
hazardous activities by some courts."
The second theory is that of Rylands v. Fletcher,07 creating liabil-
ity for "non-natural" use of land. The cases are diverse as to what is
"non-natural" use, with few involving environmental considerations."
The third approach, that of the Restatement of Torts, allows recovery
for unintentional torts only if they are "otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous con-
duct."9" Thus, the Rylands rule has been tightened from "non-natural"
to "ultrahazardous."' 00 This leaves the plaintiff without recovery where
harmful gases unintentionally and non-negligently escape but the un-
natural use is not ultrahazardous.' 0 ' The wise plaintiff clearly then should
allege nuisance, trespass, and res ipsa loquitur rather than rely solely
upon strict liability.
b. Negligence
The relaxation of the old forms of action has given rise to what
have been called negligent trespass 12 and nuisance,'0 3 presumably in
recognition of the interests invaded. The characterization is of minor
importance, as the cases are otherwise like all negligence suits, allowing
recovery for personal injury unrelated to property ownership,04 unlike
trespass and nuisance.'08
The major problem in such cases is in establishing the standard of
14, at § 88 (nuisance); Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
457 (1959).
95. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
96. Many courts refusing by name the approach of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868), accept it in this form. See Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV.
399 (1942). The Rylands rule may be viewed as a form of single incident, substantial injury
nuisance. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480, 488 (1949).
97. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
98. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 77; Comment, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance,
24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 314, 315-16 n.22 (1967).
99. RESTATEMENT Or TORTS § 822 (d) (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b)
(Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
100. Ultrahazardous conduct necessarily involves risk which cannot be eliminated and
not of common usage. RESTATEMENT Or TORTS § 520 (1939). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) (merely two of six factors).
101. See Fritz v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1960);
Waschak v. Moffat Coal Co., 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954). But see Lutheringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
102. See note 70 supra.
103. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 596 (private nuisance); id. at 598 (public). But see
Gray v. Southern Facilities, 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971).
104. E.g., Iagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86
(1954) (laryngeal cancer aggravated by driving through chemical smog).
105. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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care. However, the courts have been helpful. In Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co., °6 plaintiffs established the escape of fluorides from the de-
fendant's plant. The court applied res ipsa loquitur, stating that "when
the plaintiff proved the emanation of fluorine compounds ... and the in-
jury suffered by him as a result thereof, he made out a prima-facie case
of negligence .... "1'0  The decision was affirmed 08 in light of testimony
that normal operation would ordinarily not cause damage and because
of the superior knowledge of the defendant, which creates in him a higher
duty of care.1 9
The standard of care may also be measured by statutory require-
ments,"' industry standards,"' or perhaps by some measure of the state
of the art of pollution control. One expression of the latter standard,
made in a trespass case, is that the defendant must show that the pollu-
tion "was unavoidable or that it could not be prevented except by the
expenditure of such vast sums of money as would substantially deprive
it of the use of its property.
' 1 2
Causation is a second vexatious element in negligence pollution
cases, particularly in urban air pollution injuries." 3 Once again, however,
the courts have eased the burden, this time by shifting it to the polluter
upon establishment of a prima facie case. In Hagy v. Allied Chemical
& Dye Corp,"" defendant's sulphuric acid smog allegedly caused plain-
tiff's latent laryngeal cancer to "light up." The court affirmed a verdict
for plaintiff, stating:
The burden did not rest upon [plaintiff] to prove that the
removal of [plaintiff's] larynx would not have been necessary
but for her exposure to the smog; the burden was rather upon
106. 135 F. Supp. 379 (D. Ore. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide,
258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
107. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 135 F. Supp. 379, 382 (D. Ore. 1952).
108. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
840 (1958).
109. RESTATEMENT (SEcON) OF TORTS § 289(b) (1965).
110. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 35. Such violation can be negligence per se (ma-
jority), presumptively negligent, or merely evidence of negligence. In Florida, violation of a
statute enacted to protect a class of persons is negligence per se, while violation of one to
protect the public at large is prima facie evidence of negligence. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
v. deJesus, 266 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); Baldridge v. Hatcher, 266 So. 2d 112 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1972).
111. The failure to use a well-known pollution control system may "permit an inference
that failure to use that better system at that time constituted negligence." Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
The custom of the industry standard might perpetuate a polluting industry, as a recent
survey of pollution control device manufacturers revealed "the almost universal complaint
.. that industry was not willing to invest in the latest, most adequate control technology."
Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv.
CIv. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 32, 34 (1970).
112. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D. Ore. 1963).
113. See generally Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution
of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 17 (1966).
114. 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1964).
COMMENT
[defendants] to convince the jury that the operation would
have been ultimately necessary in any event, even though the
cancerous larynx had not been traumatized .... . 5
The negligence action, then, has many drawbacks as a land-use
control device, but it can be effectively used by creative counsel where
personal injury unrelated to land ownership is involved.
5. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Use of land which interferes with the water rights of others, affect-
ing quality or quantity, can result in common law liability.' The law
historically, but illogically," 7 has distinguished watercourses, surface
water, and both percolating and underground streams of subterranean
water." ' The principles applied to watercourses, the doctrine of riparian
rights," 9 are illustrative.12
°
The term "riparian rights" denotes two distinct theories. The na-
tural flow theory, a common law and minority view, is that each abutting
land owner has the right to have the water remain in substantially its
natural state of quantity and quality.12' The reasonable use theory, which
is the majority view of the doctrine of riparian rights, maintains that
each riparian proprietor has an equal right to make maximum use of the
water, affecting both quantity and quality in the absence of unreason-
able interference with the rights of others. 22 This view obviously is more
likely to aid economic development and fit the frontier psychology of
unlimited resources. 23 This standard appears to be a form of water nui-
sance, requiring substantial interference to create liability.
115. Id. at 370, 265 P.2d at 92. This is perhaps an outgrowth of the "take your victim
as you find him" concept of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965). Much the
same approach was taken in an action for brain damage by carbon monoxide to a bus pas-
senger. Greyhound Corp. v. Blakely, 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958).
116. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971);
B. Gindler, Water Pollution and Quality Controls, in 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 13
(R. Clark gen. ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as B. Gindler]; Busby, American Water Rights
Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106 (1952).
117. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Ground Water: Legal Problems in Managing a Pre-
cious Resource, 21 U. MIAzsa L. REv. 751 (1967).
118. E.g., Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780 (1896).
119. The term is properly applicable to a stream of water flowing in a definite direc-
tion or course in a channel with banks and bed. Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Roberts, 110
So. 2d 82 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959). The same term is often applied to littoral owners, those on
the shore of a sea or a lake. See City of Eustis v. Firster, 113 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
120. See generally Hunt, Riparian Rights in Florida, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 393 (1955);
Maloney & Plager, Florida's Streams-Water Rights in a Water Wonderland, 10 U. FLA. L.
Rxv. 294 (1957).
121. E.g., City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610 (1897). The theory
is based upon the maxim aqua curret et debet currere in modo quo currere solebat-water
flows and ought to flow as it has been wont to flow. Goble v. Louisville & N.R.R., 187
Ga. 243, 200 S.E. 259 (1938).
122. E.g., Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872); Townsend v. Bell,
167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901).
123. In the water-short western states a contrary rule is followed, that of prior appro-
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
The exact difference between the standards is as elusive as the
difference between ordinary and gross negligence:
Most courts, either not realizing that there are two distinct
theories or not fully grasping their fundamental differences,
attempt to apply both theories, with results that are not only
illogical but weirdly inconsistent at times.
124
More charitably, most courts have been in a state of transition from
the older natural flow to the reasonable use theory, albeit subliminally.'25
Also, the natural flow theory is not entirely distinct from the reasonable
use standard, as it does not require complete purity, only that the water
be fit for the lower owner's domestic and natural uses, including drink-
ing.
1 26
The riparian rights doctrine, especially in the reasonable use form,
is intertwined with nuisance. Thus, the riparian owner can affect the
quality of the water to some degree, being liable only for substantial ad-
verse impact.127 Also, as with nuisance, unintentional invasions do not
create liability, despite substantial harm, in the absence of ultrahazard-
ous activity' 8 or negligence. 2 9 Special injury must be shown for private
equitable relief.' The right is subject to prescription,'' although statu-
tory authorization to deposit wastes and effluents does not prevent the
tort action. 82 Also, as for nuisance, the courts generally reject aesthetic
priation-first come, first served. However, the majority of states follow the riparian rights
doctrine. E.g., Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 201 P. 702 (1921).
124. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Scope Note to ch. 41, at 346 (1939).
125. Florida, with few cases, has no clear position. An early case seems purely natural
flow. See Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909). Yet an even earlier dictum stated that "it is therefore
only for an unauthorized and unreasonable use . . . that any one has just cause to com-
plain." Tampa Waterworks v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 595, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896). The recent
cases are reasonable use oriented, all uses being equal and subservient to domestic purposes
of home or farm. See Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1950); Brown v.
Ellingson, 224 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) ; Lake Gibson Land Co. v. Lester, 102 So. 2d
833 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
126. E.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & RR. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167 (1893).
127. Id. The reasonable use theory carries with it the right to discharge wastes. See,
e.g., Donnelly Brick Co. v. New Britain, 106 Conn. 167, 137 A. 745 (1927); Ferguson v.
Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 42 N.W. 448 (1889).
The question of reasonableness depends not alone upon the extent and nature of the
impurities projected into this stream, but upon the location of the plaintiff's land,
the use to which it was devoted, the effect upon it . . . and the extent to which
pollution of the waters may have been attributable to other sources ...
Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 471, 60 N.E. 757, 760 (1901).
128. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Sparto, 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959) (alternative
holding).
129. See generally B. Gindler, supra note 116, at § 211.2.
130. See Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Ship-
pers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909). This is because the waters navigable in fact
belong to the state, so that most wrongs are to the public. Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee,
62 Fla. 549, 57 So. 428 (1912). See notes 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
131. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 8, 69 (1927).
132. Hodges v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 174 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965), appeal
dismissed, 382 U.S. 160 (1965). This is contra to the rule of nuisance. See note 28 supra.
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considerations in favor of economic utility, because the "riparian owner
has no proprietary right in a beautiful scene presented by a river any
more than any other owner of land could claim a right to a beautiful
landscape." '3
6. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine"3 is yet another minor common law re-
striction upon use of land. Basically, it is the judicial recognition of a
trustee-beneficiary relationship between the government and public re-
lating to the disposition of public land, primarily submerged lands in
navigable135 waters.
136
The trust attaches to such land held by the government so that man-
damus will lie, after exhaustion of administrative remedies, to compel
use or disposition of the property in accordance with the public inter-
est.3  The trust also remains as a quasi-easement upon public lands
which have passed to private ownership. 3 However, this "easement"
cannot serve as the basis to deny a dredge and fill permit unless the
adverse effect upon the public interest would be material.3 9
The doctrine has been severely limited in scope-largely to land
133. International Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 892-93, 30 S.E.2d 537, 540
(1944).
134. See generally Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact,
2 MiNN. L. REV. 313 (1918); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mic. L. REv. 471 (1970); Note, Conveyances of Sov-
ereign Lands Under the Public Trust Doctrine: When Are They in the Public Interest?, 24
U. FLA. L. REv. 285 (1972); Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Sub-
merged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
135. Florida requires that they be navigable in fact, although in practice, the courts
have only required capability of navigation. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274
(1927); Lopez v. Smith, 145 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962). See generally F. MALONEY,
S. PLACER & F. BALDwIN, WATER LAW AND ADmiNISTRATION 35-44 (1968).
136. The great majority of cases involve such lands, although the doctrine includes all
public property of a "special character." Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) ;
State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). One example of special
character property is a public park. Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n, 46 Ill. 2d 330,
263 N.E. 2d 11 (1970); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.
2d 114 (1966).
137. E.g., In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1, 182 Wis. 404, 196
N.W. 874, cert. denied, 264 U.S. 598 (1924).
138. "When the sovereign grants or conveys the title to land under navigable water,
such title passes subject to the public easements, and to the riparian rights allowed by law."
Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 410, 50 So. 826, 830 (1909). See also State v. Black River
Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). No such cases involving lands not under
water have been found.
139. Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Nav. Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
However, the statute authorizing the sale granted fill rights, raising the spectre of taking
without compensation. The case is criticized in Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection
for the Remains of Florida's Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 459, 495 (1971).
Fortunately, the Army Corps of Engineers stepped into the breach (for once) and denied
the permit on ecological grounds. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910 (1971). See notes 219-20 infra and accompanying text.
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beneath navigable waters-and in effectiveness, as courts are loath to
review administrative discretion in the absense of fraud, corruption, bad
faith or unfair dealings. 4' Professor Sax suggests that the courts can
and should grasp the public trust doctrine and use it wherever govern-
mental regulation is involved, that the doctrine applies "in controversies
involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of
rights of way for utilities, and to strip mining or wetland filling on pri-
vate lands in a state where governmental permits are required."'' While
an early Supreme Court case indicated that the doctrine was limited to
property of special character, 42 the duty of state officers to consider
environmental factors in granting permits is clear in some state con-
stitutions,'48 providing ample reason to extend the public trust doctrine.
7. CONCLUSION
This overview of common law land-use control devices is far from
exhaustive. New tools may possibly be forged in the courts44 despite or
in conjunction with the legislative response. Yet the devices leave much
to be desired from all points of view. For the environmentalist, the rights
are too rigid and encrusted with the 19th Century judicial concern for
embryonic industries. Private suits, especially against large industries,
are notoriously slow and expensive; proof can be burdensome, especially
in multiple source situations; injunction is difficult to obtain; and threat-
ened harms can rarely be interdicted.
For the landowner also, the common law devices are deficient. The
defense of such suits is as expensive and time-consuming as the prose-
cution, especially as long-established defenses are eroding. The suits,
being ex post facto, provide little of the certainty so urgently sought by
business persons and their counsel.
Yet the existence and usefulness of these actions cannot be over-
looked. They will continue to be the major tool in individual rights
oriented land-use disputes although limited in number. The newer regula-
tory remedies discussed in the following sections complement, rather
than supplant, the common law and traditional statutes.'45 They have and
140. E.g., Rogers v. City of Mobile, 277 Ala. 261, 169 So. 2d 282 (1964). But see
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
141. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 MICH. L. RFv. 471, 556-59 (1970) (emphasis added). The professor also sug-
gests that where competing public interests are involved, the courts should in effect remand
the question to the legislature. J. SAX, DEPENDING THE ENVIRONN NT ch. 5 (1971).
142. See note 136 supra.
143. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1968) provides: "It shall be the policy of the state to
conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. . . ." See also MICH. CoNsr.
art. 4, § 52 (1963); N.Y. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 4 (1970).
144. See, e.g., Beckman, Right to a Decent Environment Under the Ninth Amendment,
46 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1971); Comment, Quo Warranto to Enforce a Corporate Duty Not
to Pollute the Environment, 1 EcoL. L.Q. 653 (1971).
145. See Miller & Barchers, Private Lawsuits and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.J.
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will continue to provide a crucible for litigation in which the issues and
solutions will be refined.
B. Traditional Statutory Land-Use Control Devices
The complexity, expense and uncertainty of land-use control litiga-
tion led to the proliferation of statutes and regulatory devices. This ten-
dency was given impetus by the landmark case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 4 ' validating zoning. However, in light of a 1306
statute which made the burning of sea coal a capital offense,147 it could
be argued that environmental statutes have mellowed over the years.
The number and variety of statutes in some way affecting the use of
land can be staggering, even within one state . 4  This section will merely
present an overview of the more common forms of traditional legislation,
with emphasis upon the innovative trends within each form.
1. FACTORS AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF LAND-USE CONTROL STATUTES
Numerous land-use control statutes have been held to be invalid
exercises of the police power, many being labeled as takings without just
compensation. This terminology is probably misapplied 4 ' in the great
majority of cases, as the constitutional compensation clauses 10 were in-
tended to apply to and specifically limit the exercise of the otherwise
absolute' 5 ' power of eminent domain. 5 2 It is submitted that most of the
statutes held invalid violate substantive' 53 or procedural due process.
This is reflected in the three broad requisites'54 for proper exercise of
the police power: (1) a proper objective, within the scope of protection
465 (1970); Comment, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution,
10 Axzz. L. REV. 107 (1968).
146. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
147. Mentioned in State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 8 N.J. 359, 365, 86 A.2d 1, 4 (1952).
148. See, e.g., Comment, Survey of Environmental Legislation, 26 U. MiAMI L. REV. 778
(1972), providing an overview of Florida statutory law.
149. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
150. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6 (1968).
151. E.g., Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23 (1851). But see Riverside Military Academy
v. Watkins, 155 Fla. 283, 19 So. 2d 870 (1944), suggesting in dictum that the due process
clause would require compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent domain in the
absence of a compensation clause.
152. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). The professor's
test would limit the right to compensation for non-physical takings to any act which "en-
hances the economic value of some governmental enterprise." Id. at 67; see, e.g., City of
Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (Super. Ct. 1961)
(zoning as playground). However, many statutes invalidated as "takings without compen-
sation" lack this element of de facto appropriation.
153. Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have abandoned its position,
adopted in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), of ignoring questions of substantive
due process. See Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
154. See Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REv. 261, 263-67 (1971).
1973 ]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
of public health, safety, morals or general welfare; 155 (2) means reason-
ably related to the object;' 56 and (3) reasonable exercise of the power.5 7
The majority of invalid "takings without compensation" reflect the
courts' position that the questioned statute is an arbitrary, unreasonable
or "unfair" exercise of the police power, seemingly a question of due
process, not compensation. 58
Looking beyond the juristic reasoning, the ultimate question is
whether the land-use control statute will be upheld. As the courts, with
the exception of criminal cases, tend to be more solicitous of property
rights than of personal rights, 50 the cry of "Taking without compensa-
tion!" can be a wise tactic. In this light, there are a number of character-
istics common to statutes invalidated on the stated basis of taking with-
out compensation; although perhaps none is sufficient fault in itself to be
fatal, any combination will often tip the scale. The most important ele-
ment is the severity of the impact of the regulation upon the value of
the property.' 60 While a large decrease is but rarely sufficient of itself,' 6'
it is present in the great majority of successful attacks upon such
statutes. 2
The invalid land-use control statutes may violate equal protection
by regulating or eliminating only one form of a type of activity,'63 or
perhaps by favoring existing businesses.' With other statutes, the gov-
ernment has effectively turned private property into its own without a
physical entry. 65 Occasional cases involve wrongful or malicious intent
155. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
156. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Very few statutes are in-
validated on this substantive due process basis, the courts requiring merely a "fairly de-
batable" or other limited showing. E.g., Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480,
3 So. 2d 364 (1941). But see Starr v. Linzell, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 84, 129 N.E.2d 659 (Ct. of
C.P. 1955).
157. E.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
158. See generally Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1958 Term,
27 U. CHI. L. REV. 128, 160-62 (1959).
159. But see Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (no sub-
stantial federal question where statute banning sale of hides of non-indigenous endangered
species was passed without hearings); A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 264
N.E.2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970).
160. E.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
161. E.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87 1/2% decrease); Consoli-
dated Rock Prod. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638,
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (destroyed all "appreciable economic value" but no
substantial federal question). But see Safer v. Jacksonville, 237 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970)
(costs beyond reasonable relation to public welfare).
162. Of course, minor diminution in value by governmental regulation must be borne
by the owner, for "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
163. E.g., Eskind v. Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963) (ban only on signs ad-
vertising lodging rates).
164. E.g., Abdo v. Daytona Beach, 147 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962) (limiting com-
mercial uses to fully developed areas). This type of discrimination also opens the regulation
to attack for lack of a rational basis.
165. These are especially distasteful cases, leaving the tax burden but taking the value
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on the part of a governing body.' Finally, the courts are extremely
wary of avant-garde means or ends; the innovative statute is likely to
be held invalid unless its advocates carefully prepare the courts.16 Each
of these elements can be found in certain forms of the major traditional
land-use control statutes to be discussed.
2. ZONING
The land-use control device which is most common6 8  and least
popular with city planning experts is zoning, although most communi-
ties treat zoning and planning as coterminous.6 Zoning as a viable Ameri-
can institution was spawned in the tumultuous invasion of Fifth Avenue
by the garment industry, ruffling the sensitive carriage trade;1 70 indeed
zoning
was no more than a rational and comprehensive extension of
public nuisance law, with the great advantage [over the com-
mon law nuisance] of providing all landowners with knowledge
of the property. See Forde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941). Examples
include de facto creation of a game preserve by closed seasons, Alford v. Finch, 155 So. 2d
790 (Fla. 1963); zoning as a park, school or playground, City of Plainfield v. Borough of
Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (Super. Ct. 1961); zoning as a water storage
pond, Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 261 S.W.2d 619
(Ky. 1953); and prohibition upon alteration of "landmark" buildings, Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
166. While most courts insist that they refuse to inquire into the motives behind stat-
utes valid on their face, many indeed do pierce the veil. Compare, e.g., Miami v. Romar, 73
So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954), with Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311,
31 So. 2d 483 (1947), and Board of Comm'rs of State Inst. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust
Co., 108 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958), aff'd, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959).
167. A prime example is the line of cases involving aesthetics as the sole object of the
police power. Early courts held such purposes to be without the scope of the police power;
later courts diligently searched for some pendant public welfare, health or morals objective;
and the modem trend is to accept aesthetic purposes as within the ambit of the general
welfare. See Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27
S. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1954). A rather ludicrous scramble to find a rationale for upholding
a billboard ban led one court to solemnly state, inter alia, that people hid behind them to
commit immoral actsl Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177
(1944). The fathers of zoning were careful to establish a line of cases upholding the con-
cept. S. ToLL, Zo= AmrEicsA ch. 7 (1969).
168. The only major city without zoning is Houston, Texas, which accomplishes much
the same result by extensive private restrictive covenants, enforced by discretionary issuance
of building permits. See R. BABCOCK, Tiz ZomxG GAM 25-28 (1966); Siegan, Non-Zoning
in Houston, 13 J. LAw & EcoN. 71 (1970); Comment, Houston's Invention of Necessity-
An Unconstitutional Substitute for Zoning?, 21 BAYILOR L. REV. 307 (1969).
169. More cynically, the sole planning objective of most communities is the insulation
and protection of the single-family residential area, adequately achieved by zoning. See
generally R. BAscocx, THE ZoNwo GAa (1966). This was admitted by one of the fathers
of zoning: "Every one knows that the crux of the zoning problem lies in the residential
district, and that when we speak of amenity we have in mind residential preference."
Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning,
24 Iu.. L. REv. 135, 146 (1929).
170. See S. ToLL, ZoNwD AzaEmcA (1969).
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before the fact of what they could and could not do with their
land.1
7 '
Of course, certainty can be a mixed blessing in the eyes of the land-
owners, as reflected in the notorious abuses of the exception and variance
procedures. 2
Zoning, intended to protect residential and commercial uses from
incompatible intrusions, is a negative device, increasingly ineffective
and inflexible in the face of changing demands of society. 78 It has al-
most invariably been of the Euclidean form," 4 based upon uniform grid-
iron districts laid out in accordance with a comprehensive plan. 5 As
one court stated, the result "resembles the design achieved by using a
cookie cutter on a sheet of dough.1'1
7
The inflexibility of zoning spurred the development of a galaxy of
modifications of the traditional Euclidean zoning. It could be argued that
these changes result in a creature far removed from zoning; yet the
term accurately can include far more than the stereotyped conventional
territorial division of land according to suitability of use, with uniform
use within each district. The minimum and irreducible requirement
would seem to be a comprehensive plan of some form to allay charges
of arbitrary exercise of the police power. 7
One weakness of most plans providing for greater discretion and
flexibility in the zoning officials is the likelihood of attacks upon the de-
vice as an invalid delegation of legislative power. This line of attack
looks especially promising against the "shrinking zone" approach, in
which the zoning board is allowed to vary the bulk and density require-
ments for an area as small as an individual lot.'7 8 While this clearly over-
comes the carbon copy, "cookie cutter" effect, it resembles spot zoning
too much to survive in the courts which universally frown upon the latter
concept.
7 1
A major variation used to provide flexibility in zoning is the float-
ing zone. It involves the definition and description of a zone for a cer-
171. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONINO GAME 4 (1966).
172. See, e.g., Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study
in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in
Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 Mn. L. REv. 3 (1969); Comment, Zoning: Variance
Administration in Alameda County, 50 CAL. L. REV. 101 (1962); Comment, Zoning Variances
in New York City, 3 CoLum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 120 (1967).
173. See Note, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a
Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 335 (1972).
174. This was the type of zoning in the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
175. Sie Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154
(1955).
176. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 629, 241 A.2d 81, 83 (1968).
177. See, e.g., Rockhill v. Chesterfield Twp., 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
178. See Mandelken, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 89-91.
179. See note 186 infra and accompanying text in particular.
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tain use, generally of a community service type, but with no exact loca-
tion on the zoning map. When a landowner offering to meet the conditions
of the floating zone makes application, the zone is then "anchored" upon
his land? °0 While this technique has been held invalid for failure to be
in accordance with a comprehensive plan,' the majority of courts uphold
the device, 82 especially where the state enabling act makes express pro-
vision for it.
A more complex form of the floating zone is the Planned Unit De-
velopment (PUD). 13 This approach allows the developer to burst the
bonds of lot-by lot zoning by submitting a proposal for a relatively large
scale development. The most common restriction is that the density of
development remain fixed, but the developer is allowed to cluster and
mix housing types-injecting the potential for creativity, flexibility,
and variety. As with floating zones, the PUD met early resistance,'8 4 but
this is giving way even in the absence of express provision in zoning
enabling acts.185
180. See generally Aloi, Floating Zones, in ZONING AND LAND USE 63 (PLI No. 54, 1972);
A. RATHKOPr, THE LAw OF ZONING An PLANNING 9-10 (Supp. 1971); Reno, Non-Euclidean
Zoning: The Use oj the Floating Zone, 23 MD. L. REV. 105 (1963); Comment, The Float-
ing Zone: A Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 85 (1966); Re-
port, Planned Unit Development and Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 61 (1972).
181. E.g., Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). While
the court distinguished comprehensive planning from the comprehensive plan required by
statute, the true rationale of the decision may have been the fear of "situations in which
the personal predilections of the supervisors or the affluence or political power of the ap-
plicant ... would control." Id. at 218, 164 A.2d at 11. But see Cheney v. Village 2 at New
Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968). The device, especially as applied to smaller
areas, also resembles invalid spot zoning and may mislead a cautious court. See note 173
infra and accompanying text. See generally Haar & Hering, The Lower Gwynedd Township
Case: Too Flexible Zoning or An Inflexible Judiciary?, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1552 (1961).
182. Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 159 Conn. 1, 266 A.2d 396 (1969); Huff v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957); Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302
N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174
N.W. 2d 533 (1970).
183. See generally Symposium, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1965) (excellent); Aloi, Legal
Problems in Planned Unit Development, I REAL ESTATE L.J. 5 (1972); Comment, Planned
Unit Development, 35 Mo. L. REV. 27 (1970); Report, Planned Unit Developments and
Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 61 (1972).
184. E.g., Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 162 Cal. App. 2d
222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Ct. App. 1968). Relatively few cases squarely hold the device in-
valid, although a number have found evidentiary or procedural errors. The arguments for
and against, and an analysis of their success, are compiled in Report, Planned Unit Develop-
ments and Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 61, 63-64 (1972).
Another problem in presenting a PUD proposal is convincing the zoning authority that
its benefits outweigh the detriments. An organized and documented cost-benefit analysis is
most persuasive. The format followed in an actual presentation is analyzed in Crouch &
Weintraub, Cost-Benefit Analysis of a PUD, 32 URBAN LAND No. 6 at 3 (June 1973).
185. E.g., Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 768,
90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1st Dist. 1970) ; Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412,
79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969). The 1925 model planning law, copied in many states,
contains a section which may provide for PUD development. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit
Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 47, 79-85 (1965).
There must still be, however, some form of comprehensive plan. For example, an at-
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The term "spot zoning" has been used by many courts in holding
floating zones and PUD's invalid. The abuses of spot zoning, basically
singling out a small parcel of land for a substantially different use absent
the public welfare, but with favoritism in mind, are not as likely with
the larger areas involved in these devices. Rathkopf suggests that the
term has no real meaning, being only "a word of opprobrium used by
the courts to describe or justify the result which they have reached in
a particular situation, rather than as the definition of a particular con-
cept of law."'8s0
Another zoning innovation is the definition of land-use regions, not
by express uses or types of use, but by performance standards, specify-
ing maximum levels of noxious by-product production to which any use
within the zones must conform. 87 If used as the sole means of use defini-
tion, much greater intra-zone diversity is possible. This runs counter to
a trend against cumulative zoning, in which higher, generally residen-
tial, uses are being barred from lower use districts. 8 However, it is
likely that, at least in residential areas, the traditional exclusionary
limitations would be continued in light of the "extraordinary sensitive-
ness of property to its surroundings"' 8 in America. This is in contrast
to Europe, where
[p]eople do not mind a little store around the corner a bit....
We wouldn't have that in this country because it is not con-
tempt to zone the entire area for a limited number of uses but grant variances for bene-
ficial "Special Uses" has been held to be an invalid delegation of legislative power to the
zoning board. Rockhill v. Chesterfield Twp., 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957). Nor can the
permitted uses of the PUD itself be left open to special permitting. Marshall v. Village of
Wappingers Falls, 28 App. Div. 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dept. 1967).
186. 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 26-1 (1960). The courts
rarely object to rezoning of small plots where there is no evidence of abuse, as in case-by-
case gas station siting. See, e.g., Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281
N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1940); Bucholz v. City of
Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963). Indeed, spot zoning is a useful tool in situa-
tions where the only permitted use is not feasible. Platt, Valid Spot Zoning: A Creative Tool
For Flexibility of Land Use, 48 ORE. L. REV. 245 (1969).
187. See generally Gillespie, Industrial Zoning and Beyond: Compatibility Through
Performance Standards, 46 J. URBAN L. 723 (1969); Hirsch, Measuring the Good Neighbor:
A New Look at Performance Standards in Zoning, 2 LAND USE CONTROLS Q. 5 (1968);
McDougal, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47 TrL.
L. REV. 255 (1973); Comment, A Model Ordinance to Control Urban Noise Through Zon-
ing Performance Standards, 8 HARv. J. LFoS. 608 (1971). Without clearly defined standards
the performance zoning statute will be void for vagueness. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ander-
son, 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954).
188. See Plum v. City of Healdsburg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 308, 46 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1st
Dist. 1965). The majority of statutes are cumulative, allowing higher uses in all lower use
districts upon the erroneous belief that the higher uses can be of no detriment to the lower
uses. Thus, the supposed benefit to the higher uses can be evaded and the lower use also
will be inhibited. See Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954
U. ILL. L.J. 186; Note, Industrial Zoning to Exclude Higher Uses, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1261
(1957).
189. Discussion with E. Freund, in W. FELL, PLANNINO PROBLEMS or TOWN, CITY AND
REGION 79 (1929).
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formable with our ideas.... I think it is connected with our
democratic institutions; where you haven't got natural class
differences you make [them] artifically, but I think the fact is
undeniable. 90
Another device used to encourage creativity in zoning is contract
or conditional zoning. This is really little more than a bargaining situa-
tion in which the landowner, prior to a desired zoning amendment, agrees
to permanent restrictive covenants which are conditional upon the re-
zoning.1' 1 As the government cannot bargain away its power, the cove-
nants must be made before and without promise of rezoning. The device
is also open to attack as spot zoning or as being an improper delegation
of power to the board,' 92 but it has often been upheld.'08
An innovative concept related to zoning is the dwelling unit right.
Under this system, the planners determine the desired population and
correlative number of dwelling units. This latter number of rights to
build dwelling units is equally spread over the residential land. The
rights are freely transferable, so that one who buys rights from the land-
owners to build high density housing thus leaves vacant or less densely
developed land elsewhere.19 4 This approach limits population, may avoid
the inequities to those prevented from building by emergency moratoria,
and may lead to a more even distribution of the profits of land develop-
ment.
3. OPEN SPACE ZONING
The environmental damage inflicted by urban sprawl and the ap-
pearance of the megalopolis led to the adoption of a large variety of
statutes aimed at preservation of open space and ecological balance:
wetland and flood plain zoning, scenic preservation zones, coastal pro-
tection districting, and various forms of rural reserve and "green belt"
areas are typical. Although these are primarily variations upon the zon-
ing theme, their severe impact upon land value is obvious and sparks
anguished cries of "taking without compensation."' 9 The courts have
190. Discussion with E. Freund, in W. FELL, PLaNNING PROBLEMS O' TOWN, CITY AND
REGioN 79 (1929).
191. See generally Shapiro, The Case For Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMPLE L.Q. 267
(1968); Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. REv. 121 (1963); Comment, Zoning and Con-
comitant Agreements, 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 197 (1963); Comment, Contract Zoning: A Flex-
ible Technique For Protecting Maine Municipalities, 24 ME. L. REv. 263 (1972).
192. See Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); New Products Corp. v. City
of North Miami, 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
193. E.g., Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.
2d 118 (1962). Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1960).
194. Miami Herald, June 21, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 3 (letter from Morris C. Tucker,
president of the Broward Citizens for Environmental Preservation, Inc.) ; id. at col. 1 (edi-
torial, A New Approach to 'Stop-Growth').
195. See the analysis of 500 randomly selected cases in Kusler, Open Space Zoning:
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been highly receptive to this argument in many situations, so that careful
drafting, innovative approaches, and skillful advocacy are necessary to
insure open space preservation.1"'
The statutes forbidding the filling or other substantial "improve-
ment" of wetlands, although lacking the physical invasion generally
characteristic of true takings, do present the conversion to public use
aspect of invalid takings. 197 The wetlands cases reflect the problems found
in all such open land statutes. The courts, sensitive to the sharp diminu-
tion in value and denial of nearly all reasonable use,'08 have held the
majority of such statutes invalid. 99
The courts do not seem to be insensitive to environmental consid-
erations or to the necessity of preserving wetlands; rather, they are
using a balancing test which requires some element of direct and im-
mediate public harm200 beyond that to the ecology before allowing such
harsh regulation without compensation. Thus a showing of public nui-
sance or danger to the owner may be needed to tip the scales, although
the courts are beginning to accord much greater weight to ecological
considerations.20' This reflects the awakening of the courts to environ-
mental problems 2°2 as well as the greater recognition of aesthetics as a
Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MiNN. L. REv. 1, 3-4 n.4 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Kusler]. See section II, B, 1 supra.
196. See generally Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in
Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1972) (excellent coverage
of the necessity for wetlands protection); Kusler, supra note 182 (excellent and thorough
coverage of the factors involved); Schroeder, Preservation and Control of Open Space in
Metropolitan Areas, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 345 (1972) ; One of the better books on the subject of
open space preservation is W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE (1968).
197. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); see note 165 supra
and accompanying text.
198. Many of these statutes restrict the owner to conservation uses such as forestry and
wildlife sanctuaries, harvesting of wild crops, installation of docks and the like. Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A.2d 232 (1963) ; Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
199. E.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964);
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Hafkin v. White-
marsh, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 (Montgomery County Ct. 1967).
The later cases reveal a leaning toward preservation of vital ecological features. Just v.
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Compare In re Spring Valley
Development, 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973), with State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
Perhaps the avant garde line of attack, note 167 supra, is beginning to wear thin. See gen-
erally Council on Environmental Quality, Fourth Annual Report ch. 4 (1973).
200. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515,
370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (nuisance-like use) ;
Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (1966) (unsafe to build on
area, subject to storm damage). See generally Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation:
A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REV. 261, 285-89 (1971); Kusler, supra
note 195, at 21-28.
201. The California courts, while speaking the balancing test, have heavily shifted the
emphasis from the private loss to the public good. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Fran-
cisco Bay Const. & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1st Dist. 1970).
202. See note 199 supra. "Courts will not pretend to be more ignorant than the rest of
mankind." Marshall Field & Co. v. City of Chicago, 44 IlM. App. 410, 411 (1892).
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valid object of the police power. 3 Occasionally other factors will mili-
tate against the validity of statutes, as where courts reject the use of
large minimum lot sizes, useful in open space planning,20 4 because of the
fear of economic and racial exclusionary zoning.205 However, the major
line of attack must be that the restriction is a taking, an argument which
can be overcome by creative use of easement purchase,206 eminent do-
main, tax adjustments, more selective and flexible definition of forbidden
uses,207 and similar devices.
208
4. SUBDIVISION CONTROLS AND EXACTIONS
There is no longer much disagreement with the substantive right
of communities to require mapping and approval of subdivisions, and
the majority of states have statutes so requiring.20 9 The map approval
normally is conditioned upon the installation of much of the infrastruc-
ture at the developer's expense, with or without express sanction in the
state enabling act. Because the developer often is bargaining for zoning
variance, litigation of a local ordinance or practice, under which the
city "suggests" or requires dedication of land, is rare. In the cases where
the question has arisen, the great majority of courts have upheld the
conditioning of map approval upon the installation, at the developer's
expense, of streets, sewers or similar improvements.210
203. Florida has upheld aesthetic regulation in view of the importance of the tourist
trade. City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
204. The environmental benefits of large lot zoning are discussed in Kusler, supra note
195, at 57-61. Such a device also reduces the severity of the landowner's loss 
and "taking."
205. There is a large amount of literature on the topic, but a thorough coverage is
found in Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning oj the
End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9, reprinted in ZONING AND LAND USE 241 (PLI No. 54, 1972),
and updated in Aloi & Goldberg, Notes For a Revised Article: Exclusionary Zoning: Recent
Developments and Approaches to Litigation, ZoN1NG AND LAND USE 343 (PLI No. 54, 1972).
206. See generally Comment, Preserving Rural Land Resources, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 330
(1971); Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 728 (1971).
207. One flexible approach is being tested in Manatee County, Florida. The plan, Op-
timum Population and Urban Growth (OPUG), splits the county into four zones. Develop-
ment is encouraged in the "existing uxban" and "urban growth" areas. But in the "urban
frontier" and "rural reserve" areas, developers must show that the development would be
self-sufficient and not harmful to the existing community; further, dedication of land for
public facilities, preliminary planning, economic appraisal and an environmental impact
statement would be required. This would allow flexibility and allow a wider range of rea-
sonable uses, blunting the taking argument. The structure obviously would be applicable pri-
marily to less developed areas. Miami Herald, July 16, 1973, § A, at 6, col. I (editorial,
Manatee OPUGs the Floodgates).
208. See generally Kusler, supra note 195, at 61-81. Of course, many plans may not be
worth saving, for they may achieve the wrong ends or protect the wrong people. See e.g.,
Cooke & Power, Why Florida's Green Belt Law Won't Work, 2 REAL ESTATE REv. 84 (1972).
209. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 163.206-.290 (1971); FLA. STAT. ch. 177 (1971), as amended,
Fla. Laws 1971 ch. 71-339. See generally Fitzgerald, The Regulation of Subdivisions, 14 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 249 (1972); Yearwood, Accepted Controls of Land Subdivisions, 45 J.
URBAN L. 217 (1967).
210. E.g., Deerfield Estate, Inc. v. Township of East Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d
498 (1972) (first impression). This type of improvement or expense is easily justifiable, as
public welfare demands such items and it is reasonable to require the one creating the need
to fill it. Recreational lands and similar dedications are perhaps less vital to the public wel-
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The negotiation process more often breaks down where the munici-
pality attempts to exact dedication of land for recreational or park uses
in the absence of express provision for such exactions in the enabling
act. Many courts hold such terms to be ultra vires.211 However, other
courts, recognizing the impact of subdivisions upon the surrounding
areas, uphold provisions requiring on-site dedications if reasonably re-
lated in amount to the burden created by and "uniquely attributable"
to the developer's activity.2 a2
Even greater problems arise where the municipality exacts fees in-
stead of or in addition to land dedication; the fees normally are for off-
site improvements necessiated by the subdivider's activity, such as the
upgrading of parks and utilities. Where the fees bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the use of the facilities by future inhabitants the fees are
more likely to be upheld, being treated as in lieu of land dedication.21
Improperly limited exactions are extremely vulnerable to attack as un-
authorized taxes,214 as arbitrary and confiscatory, 215 or as discrimina-
tory.
216
fare and more suspect as exactions. Cf. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159
Fla. 311, 31 So. 2d 483 (1947), an eminent domain case where condemnation for a hunting
preserve was invalidated, public desire being held unequal to the required public necessity.
211. E.g., Admiral Development Corp. v. Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972)
(but indicates exactions would be valid if statute authorized such an ordinance or practice).
This decision was based upon a lack of inherent power, despite the home rule provision of
FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 2. Cf. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801
(Fla. 1972) (rent control invalid). This holding may be changed by the "Home Rule Bill,"
Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129, amending FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1971).
212. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880
(1970); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961). See generally 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 71, § 7
(3d ed. 1972); 3 R. ANDERSON, AmERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 19.25-.36 (1971); Johnston,
Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest For a Rationale, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 871 (1967). Many commentators feel that the exactions are invalid or improper. See,
e.g., Harvith, Subdivisions Dedication Requirements-Some Observations and an Alternative:
A Special Tax on Gain From Realty, 33 ALBANY L. REv. 474 (1969); Heyman & Gilbool,
The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964); Comment, Forced Dedications
in California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 735 (1969).
213. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
The Walnut Creek court also implied that purchase of parks in other areas with the fees
would be allowed if the proximate facilities were adequate. Walnut Creek, supra at 64 n.6,
484 P.2d at 606 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6.
214. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
215. East Neck Estates, Ltd. v. Luchsinger, 61 Misc. 2d 619, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk Cty. 1969) (required dedication of all shorefront land as public beach, reduced
value 50%).
216. Flat rate fees or dedications are more likely to be invalid, resembling taxes. See
Newport Building Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal. Rptr. 797 (4th
Dist. 1962) ($50 per lot, much of ordinance dealt with taxes); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City
of Cranston, 107 RI. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970) (7% flat rate). Apportionment purely by
population may be invalid because needs vary with composition by age and wealth. Pioneer
Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 IU. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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5. PERMITS
One who undertakes a development of any appreciable size faces a
bewildering morass of regulation, most of which requires the acquisi-
tion of permits. It has been estimated that the developer in Dade County,
Florida, may have to obtain as many as 27 permits-each with its own
procedure and terminology.217
While few permits involve actions of major, direct environmental
impact, the cumulative effect of mis-issue can be severe. Yet the tradi-
tional systems function independently, with no coordination nor "eye in
the sky" to consider the combined effects. Few have requirements of
environmental responsibility. More importantly, even those permitting
agencies whose decisions necessarily have substantial ecological impact
have historically been little concerned with such considerations. The
Army Corps of Engineers has permitted and encouraged projects of ex-
tremely detrimental impact; 218 indeed, it was recently incorrectly 219
held that the Corps had no power to deny permits on ecological
grounds.220 Fortunately, this view was promptly rejected, so that the
Corps can and should deny permits for actions which damage the
ecology.22'
Fragmentation and ecological apathy render the traditional per-
mitting systems both frustrating to the developer and ineffective for
ecological protection. Rationalization and simplification, combined with
environmental impact statements, would benefit all concerned.
217. Address by Harvey Ruvin, Environmental Land Management Study Commission
meeting, June 11, 1973, Dade County, Florida. The permit sequence chart of a major Florida
developer for coastal shore development reveals that the minimum time from project concept
to actual sales is 20 months, with more than 15 local, state and federal agencies involved.
218. See, e.g., Miller, Rape of the Oklawaha 96 RzAD. Dio. 54 (Jan. 1970). The Corps
can play an important role in environmental protection. See House Comm. on Gov't Opn's,
Our Waters and Wetlands: How the Corps of Engineers Can Help Prevent Destruction and
Pollution, H.R. REP. No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
219. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971),
upholding the Corps' denial of a permit to dredge and fill on Boca Ciega Bay in Florida de-
spite lack of adverse effect on navigation. See United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289
U.S. 352 (1933), allowing denial of a permit interfering with the public interest in a park-
way or recreational area.
220. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Resor, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla.), overruled, Zabel
v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). The Zabel trial
court at least had allowed only damages rather than allowing the plaintiff to mine the bed
of Lake Okeechobee, Florida, despite the concurrent mining operations of the Corps and a
flood control district.
Zabel is clearly the correct view; although the Corps is primarily involved with actions
affecting navigation, it must consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service but retains final
authority. 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1970). Although the situation is much improved, the Service
rarely even sought denial of permits, presumably out of frustration, as all but 120 of 28,250
permits sought were issued in the period 1962-66. Hearings on H.R. 26 Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967). The Service objected to 81 of the approximately 300
permit applications submitted to it in the same period; 11 were denied. Id. at 129.
221. See note 220 supra.
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6. CONCLUSION
The traditional statutory land-use controls are little more effective
than the common law devices for minimizing ecological damage. Few
were designed to affect the environment as such. Zoning was meant to
protect business and residential districts from incompatible uses; sub-
division exactions were largely aimed at placing the costs of subdivisions
on those living in them; and many actions requiring permits only tan-
gentially affect the environment. However, the open space zoning tech-
niques, currently meeting strong resistance, eventually will become ac-
cepted as reasonable, useful conservation tools.
The statutory devices are being modified to meet the demands of
environmental protection. Yet few make provision for the input of en-
vironmental information needed. The terminology and procedures vary
wildly from statute to statute and county to county. One county within
a region may, in an attempt to gain a short term advantage or from
ignorance, act adversely to its neighbors.222 The traditional statutory de-
vices, unless regionalized and rationalized, can provide neither the pro-
tection needed nor the efficiency desired.
III. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Four major federal environmental laws have taken effect in
the past decade: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) ;221 the Clean Air Act of 1970;224 the Federal Water Quality
Act Amendment of 1972; 22 and the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972.226 In addition, a National Land Use Policy Act has been under
consideration.22 The act passed the Senate in each of the past two years
but was rejected both times by the House.
The enacted laws have basically accomplished four things. First,
they have made all federal agencies take an interdisciplinary approach
which includes evaluation of the environmental effects of proposed
projects throughout the course of the agency's decision making process. 2 S
Second, these laws have provided substantive air and water quality
standards. 29 Third, they have provided for the abatement of air and
222. See, e.g., Bowe, Regional Planning Versus Decentralized Land-Use Controls-Zon-
ing for the Megalopolis, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 144 (1968); Haar, Regionalism and Realism
in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
224. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (Supp. 1973).
225. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
226. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
227. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
228. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970), re-
quires agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." This document must accom-
pany the proposal through the agency review process. See discussion of NEPA, section III,
a, infra.
229. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (Supp. 1973) ; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857f-5a to f-6j (Supp. 1973).
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water pollution over a period of years.23 0 Fourth, and most importantly,
they have provided for a land regulation scheme based on clean air and
water standards.23'
The question these acts raise is to what extent the federal laws will
modify the common law and statutory devices discussed previously,
either through replacement of some old remedies with provisions of the
act, or with the creation of new rights under the old remedies.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act oj 1969 (NEPA)
1. PURPOSE OF THE ACT
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony be-
tween man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological system and natural resources
important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on En-
vironmental Quality.23
The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment and that every person has a responsi-
bility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
the environment.3 3
The two sections of NEPA reproduced above represent more than
mere expressions of national policy. NEPA is the first piece of national
legislation which recognizes the importance of a clean environment to
the national health and welfare. It signals an end to a two hundred year
period in American history in which our natural resources were consid-
ered infinitely exploitable.28 4 This does not mean that NEPA gives a
private citizen a cause of action for the deterioration of his environ-
ment.2 15 Rather, the Act requires federal agencies to include the environ-
mental costs of a proposed action in an environmental impact statement
which is used in a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a project
will be undertaken.3 6
230. Id.
231. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1361a (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857g (Supp. 1973).
232. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as NEPAl.
233. Id. at § 4331(c).
234. See UDALL, Tim QUIET CRISIS (1963).
235. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971), rev'd, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970). See discussion of environmental impact statements,
infra. See also Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972); Seeley, The National Environmental Policy Act: A
Guideline for Compliance, 26 VANr. L. Rv. 295 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Seeley].
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Even though NEPA applies only to federal agencies, its provisions
extend to the private sector of our society.2 7 Thus, a land developer who
has any connection with a branch of the federal government, should as-
certain whether an environmental impact statement288 is required before
he begins work on the development.239 Failure to do so could leave him
vulnerable to an injunction until the impact statement is filed.24 Since
preparation of the statement can take as long as six months or more,
241
the consequences of failing to comply with the act in this respect are
self-evident.
Section 102 (c)242 is the critical part of the Act. It sets out the re-
quirements for the environmental impact statement, which is the docu-
ment which accompanies the proposed project through the agency's re-
view process from its inception.248 Section 102(c) requires that:
[T]o the fullest extent possible ...
(2) all agencies of the Federal government shall -... (C)
include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental affect which cannot be
avoided should the proposals be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
237. See, e.g., Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) (private developer enjoined
from cutting trees on land until federal funding agency filed environmental impact state-
ment). See also Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter cited as EPA] rules, 40
C.F.R. § 6.21 (1973); Council on Environmental Quality [hereinafter cited as CEQI guide-
lines for preparation of environmental impact statements, 40 C.F.R. ch. V, § 1500 et seq.
(1973). See note 249 infra and accompanying text.
Although NEPA requires that federal agencies file environmental impact statements only
when there is major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, the definition of federal action has been interpreted so expansively in the regulations,
guidelines and cases that mere licensing by a federal agency may invoke the procedural pro-
visions of the act. E.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971) (an impact statement
must be prepared before any permit is issued by the Army Corps of Engineers to dump
sewage in navigable waters); Davis v. Martin, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (approval of
a lease of 1200 acres of Indian lands).
238. An environmental impact statement is the name of the document required by sec-
tion 102(c) of NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970). This document is used to incorporate
the environmental costs and benefits of a proposed project into the agency's general cost-
benefit analysis. See Note, Cost-benefit analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972).
239. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973), discussed in section III, inIra.
240. Id.
241. Obviously, the length of time it will take for an agency to prepare an impact state-
ment will depend on a number of variable factors, not the least of which are the size and
complexity of a project. As an example of one extreme, it took 18 months for the Secretary
of the Interior to prepare an impact statement for the Alaska pipeline project. See Jaffe,
Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of Achieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 26
(1972).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
243. Id.
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(iv) the relationship between local short term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed ac-
tion should it be implemented. 44
The section further provides that before a detailed statement is made,
the lead agency should obtain comments from any other federal or local
agency which has special expertise or jurisdiction with respect to the
environmental impact involved. Copies of the statement are then to be
made available to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and
the public, "and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review process.
2 45
The impact statement was emphasized by the court in Committee
to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe. 46 Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the
completion of a highway, fifty percent of which was financed by the
federal government. While the highway had been planned prior to the
enactment of NEPA, two segments had not been approved by the Fed-
eral Highway Agency until after the act became effective.
Finding that design approval was a major federal action, the court
granted an injunction until an impact statement was filed. It refused to
be swayed by the argument that to require an impact statement would
increase costs due to delay of the project. The fallacy in this argument,
said the court, is that it assumes the two segments of the highway would
be completed as planned regardless of the contents of the impact state-
ment.2 47 The purpose of the impact statement is not to add paperwork
to the agency's decision process, but to ensure that the agency considers
possible environmental effects carefully.
2. WHEN MUST AN IMPACT STATEMENT BE FILED?
a. What Constitutes Federal Action?
If an impact statement is required for a "major federal action sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment... ,,.48 then,
what constitutes federal action? The CEQ guidelines2 49 provide that
"actions" include but are not limited to... [n]ew and con-
tinuing projects and program activities: directly undertaken
by Federal agencies; or supported in whole or in part through
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
247. Id. at 738.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
249. 40 C.F.R. ch. V, § 1500 et seq. (1973). The CEQ guidelines are advisory because
CEQ does not have authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA.
Green County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of
funding assistance... ; or involving a federal lease, permit,
2510license, certificate or other entitlement for use ....
It is clear that a private development could become the subject of an
impact statement if it met the above criteria for major federal action.
For example, any major land development in Florida could require an
impact statement if there were dredge and fill operations which were re-
quired to obtain federal permits251 under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899.52 To this end, the Army Corps of Engineers has given notice to
a major Florida developer that an impact statement would be required
for normal maintenance dredging of existing canals in its development.
This dredging is necessary, because without it, the canals would silt up
and become unusable. Query whether the drafters of the act intended
the requirement for impact statements to go this far. Given the size of
the staff at the Environmental Protection Agency, the filing of many
statements of this nature may result in a rubber stamp on most state-
ments due to lack of review capabilities. Thus, this application of the
Act may have degraded it into just another permit procedure, which is
inapposite to its purpose.
b. Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting
the Quality of the Human Environment
Once it is established that there is federal action in a project, the
next logical steps are to determine whether such action is major and
whether it significantly affects the quality of the human environment.
While some courts may argue that the question of whether an action is
major is separate from that of the significance of its environmental im-
pact,253 it is very difficult to logically separate these two interrelated
250. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
251. See Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Village of N. Palm Beach, 469 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1972.)
252. 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). Section 403 reads in part: "[Ilt shall not be lawful
to excavate or fill ... any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior
to beginning the same." See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1970), where the court held that the Corps of Engineers had authority to deny a per-
mit, basing the denial on environmental instead of navigational considerations. Since the suit
was originally brought before the enactment of NEPA, the Act did not apply. However, the
court did mention NEPA and to some degree appeared to rely on it as a basis for its hold-
ing.
253. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. March 5, 1973), where the court rejected the argument that if a fed-
eral action is "major," then it automatically follows that it "significantly affects the . ..
environment." See also Goose Hollow Foothills v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971). In Goose Hollow the court said "[sitatements are required by the Act if the pro-
posed project is 'major' and if it will have 'a significant effect upon the quality of the
human environment."' Id. at 879 (emphasis added). Accord, Julius v. City of Cedar Rapids,
349 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972). But see Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
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questions. 54 If an action is major then there is a great probability that
it will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. Con-
versely, it is difficult to imagine a federal action which would signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment that is not major. 55
Possibly, it could be argued that "major" implies some threshhold of
size and importance to the agency. 56 But this type of definition would
be in conflict with the spirit of the CEQ guidelines257 which provide that
section 102
254. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1972), where the court stated:
Although in some circumstances the terms "major" and "significantly affecting . . .
the . . . environment" have to be considered separately, . . . the Department of
Transportation has determined that any action significantly affecting the environ-
ment is major . . . and that any approval of a project taking parkland is one
significantly affecting the environment . . . Even apart from the Transportation
Department's Order, however, there is no difficulty in concluding that this is the type
of action which requires an impact statement. As the cost of the viaduct section alone
would be over $14,000,000, of which the federal government is asked to contribute
60%, there is no question that this is major action, . . . and it cannot be disputed
that a taking of eleven acres of parkland in a thickly settled city significantly affects
the human environment.
Id. at 698 (citations omitted). For a good discussion of how the courts have interpreted
section 4332(2) (c), see Seeley, supra note 236.
255. But see Seeley, supra note 236:
Finding a major federal action does not render inevitable the preparation of an
impact statement because the action may not have a significant effect on the en-
vironment. Superficially, it seems unlikely that a non major action could have a
significant effect on the environment. This assumption fails to recognize the possi-
bility of minor federal participation in projects having a significant environmental
impact-a federal research grant of a few thousand dollars to study erosion control
during the construction of a major state or municipally funded facility. This example
may be analyzed either by reasoning that the federal action does not significantly
affect the environment or by making the simpler determination that the action is
not major. The 2-tiered level of NEPA inquiry simplifies the decision-making process
by requiring no agency action for non-major actions, negative declarations for
major actions without significant effects, and a full-scale statement only for major
actions with significant effects.
Id. at 302 n.41.
256. Several courts have attempted to define the word "major" in section 4332(2) (c).
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the
court, finding a project requiring $700,000 of federal funding and taking several years to
complete to be a major federal action, said, "[a] 'major federal action' is federal action
that requires substantial planning, time, resources, or expenditure." Accord, Citizens Orga-
nized to Defend Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 520 (D. Ohio 1972). Compare
Julius v. Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972), which stated that, "by using
the term 'major' Congress reasonably intended to limit the Act to those federal actions of
superior, larger, and considerable importance, involving substantial expenditure of money,
time and resources," with Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court
argued that "the only involvement necessary by the federal government to constitute major
federal action is approving or licensing the project."
It seems, from a perusal of the majority of the cases involving failure of an agency to
file an impact statement, that the courts are reading the section 4332 (2) (c) requirement ex-
pansively. In Julius v. Cedar Rapids, 349 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Iowa 1972), the court found
that funding a project for 14 blocks of street construction at a cost of $300,000 to the fed-
eral government was not major federal action. Contrast this result with that in Scherr v.
Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), where the court held that conversion of 12 miles of
a two-lane highway to four lanes was major federal action. In the majority of the cases on
this point, the courts are much more in line with the decision in Scherr than that in Julius.
257. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1973).
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is to be construed by agencies with a view to the overall, cumu-
lative impact of the action proposed, related Federal actions
and projects in the area, and further actions contemplated.
Such actions may be localized in their impact, but if there is
potential that the environment may be significantly affected,
the statement is to be prepared. Proposed major actions, the
environmental impact of which is likely to be highly contro-
versial should be covered in all cases.
258
The guidelines never define what a "major" action is, although they
do say that "the words 'major' and 'significantly' are intended to imply
a threshold of importance and impact that must be met before a state-
ment is required."'259 Thus, the guidelines only outline what should be
considered by the agency.
2 60
In light of the uncertainty created by this definitional problem, it
is at least arguable that some other criteria could be used to trigger the
application of the Act. One suggested solution is to require agency action
only in cases which exceed a certain cost. For example, if the action
would cost more than X dollars, an impact statement would be required
in all cases. If the cost would be less than X dollars, the agency could
use its discretion in deciding whether an impact statement would be
appropriate. In such a case, a citizen's group suing to compel the filing
of a statement would have the burden of proving why an impact state-
ment should be required if the agency had decided that it is not necessary.
While the model suggested may be overly simplified, it has certain
benefits as compared to the CEQ's current definitions. First, a fixed
dollar test for the most part eliminates the uncertainty of whether an
impact statement should be prepared. By eliminating uncertainty, the
costs of environmental protection could be lowered. For example, one
of the cost reductions would be the elimination of a great number of
citizens' suits to compel an agency to file an impact statement before
it proceeds with its project. Furthermore, costs would be lowered, be-
cause the decision whether to prepare an impact statement would be
largely taken out of the hands of the agency, where it now rests. Since
the agency is likely to be biased261 in favor of its own proposed action,
under the present guidelines, it is possible that some agencies will decide
not to prepare an impact statement unless they are compelled to do so.
Conversely, some agencies may be preparing statements to cover actions
that do not come within the statutory phrase merely to avoid a lawsuit
over the question of whether one should be prepared.
The possibility that an agency's action could fall below the dollar
258. Id.
259. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(c) (1973).
260. Also, the guidelines are not binding because the CEQ lacks the power to promul-
gate regulations to implement NEPA. See note 249 supra.
261. Clingan, Law Affecting the Quality of Marine Environment, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV.
323 (1971).
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amount and still be damaging to the environment must be considered
since no impact statement would be required under the model presented.
However, the probability of this occurence would be minimized by de-
fining the financial threshold in such a way as to favor the preparation
of environmental impact statements in "gray areas." Besides, with less
expensive projects, the chance of a significantly adverse impact state-
ment would be minimal.
It is obvious that any solution like the model presented must be
more comprehensive to prevent abuses. For example, a method would
have to be devised for identifying cumulative actions, each one of which
falls short of the cutoff, but which pose a significantly adverse affect to
the environment when grouped together. A possible solution to this
problem would be to have the agency file a yearly report on all projects
which fall beneath the cutoff. The report could be much less inclusive
than the environmental impact statement, but it could be of value in
determining whether the system was functioning properly. The cost of
this and other deviations from the model would have to be balanced
against the benefits in changing the system.
The above suggestion is presented to point out the problems present
in deciding whether an impact statement is needed. Something should
be done to provide the agencies and the public with more certainty in
the decision-making process, as the costs in time and money of unneces-
sary litigation are enormous.262 What is needed now are not guidelines
which are not binding on anyone, but concrete regulations. Perhaps the
Act itself should be changed to be less ambiguous. Certainty in the appli-
cation of section 102 would be beneficial to all concerned and would
lower the costs of protecting the environment.
3. STANDING TO SUE UNDER NEPA
Courts have held that citizens have standing to challenge an agency
which fails to file an impact statement when one is required under the
terms of the Act. 2 3 Since section 102 (c) 2 6 4 provides that a copy of the
statement is to be made available to the public, it has been recognized as
granting a right in the public to enjoin an action until compliance with
the Act has been achieved.
2 65
262. See Busxmss WEEx, Apr. 21, 1973, at 56, on the delays affecting the construction
of nuclear power plants.
263. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (failure to prepare impact statement for $1.5 million project for channelization of 66
miles of a creek); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972) (failure to
prepare statement for maintenance dredging of a harbor); Note, America's Changing En-
vironment-Is NEPA a Change for the Better?, 40 FORD.Am L. REV. 897, 906 (1972).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
265. See, e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). "In order to have stand-
ing, groups interested in conservational factors must allege that these factors have not been
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Once standing is granted, the next question involved is whether the
citizens group has made a sufficient allegation under section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides: "A person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statutes
is entitled to judicial relief thereof. 26 6 In Sierra Club v. Morton,267 the
United States Supreme Court answered the question of "what must be
alleged by persons who claim injury of a non-economic nature to interests
that are widely shared. 268 The Sierra Club had brought suit under sec-
tion 10 on the theory that the suit was a public action involving the use
of natural resources and that the club's history of environmental involve-
ment was sufficient to give it standing. The Court rejected this argument
and held that to have standing to sue, the Sierra Club must show that it
is "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of the APA.
To do this the club must show that it (1) suffered injury in fact and
(2) that this injury was arguably within the zone of interests protected
by the statute. 69
It was not enough for the club to allege that a road built through
Sequoia National Park "would destroy or otherwise adversely affect
the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and
would impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations," 270 be-
cause such an allegation did not show that the club suffered any injury.
To come within the Court's mandate, the club should also have alleged
that its members used the park and that such use would be adversely
affected if the road were built.
The Sierra Club suit was not brought under NEPA, but under other
federal statutes regulating the uses of federal park land.271 Applying
Sierra Club's two-pronged test to NEPA, it was readily apparent that
violation of the public right derived from section 102 (c) 272 would satisfy
the "zone of interests" test in a suit to force an agency to file an impact
statement. But, it was not so apparent how the injury in fact test might
be applied.
The Supreme Court again provided the answer. In United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceeding (SCRAP) 27' an
unincorporated association of five law students sought to enjoin the In-
terstate Commerce Commission from granting an across the board rate
increase of 2.5% to the railroads. Since railroad rates already discrim-
properly considered by an administrative agency." Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Seeley, supra note 236, at 298.
266. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) (emphasis added).
267. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
268. Id. at 734.
269. Id. at 733.
270. Id. at 734.
271. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
273. 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).
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inated against recyclable goods, SCRAP argued that the rate increase
would aggravate the effects of this discrimination on the environment.
To establish standing, SCRAP claimed that "each of its members 'suf-
fered economic, recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of
the adverse environmental impact of the railroad freight structure'
))274
The Court found that these pleadings sufficiently showed that
SCRAP was "adversely affected" or aggrieved within the meaning of sec-
tion 10 of the APA." The Court emphasized that SCRAP was not to be
denied standing merely because the injury to its members in the use
of the park was suffered in common with all others who used it. "[T]o
deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many
others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and wide-
spread government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot
accept that conclusion. 2 7' The Court also rejected the argument that
since SCRAP could never prove that a general increase in rates would
have a detrimental effect on the environment, the allegations were a
ploy to avoid the need to show an injury in fact. On these pleadings
alone, the Court could not say that SCRAP could not prove its allegations.
If, in fact, the government could show that the allegations were untrue,
then it "should have moved for summary judgment on the standing is-
sue and demonstrated to the District Court that the allegations were a
sham and raised no genuine issue of fact.
'276
Finally, the Court rejected the plea from the government to limit
standing under the APA to those who have been "significantly" affected
by agency action. In a footnote the Court discussed this point:
(E)ven if we could begin to define what such a test would
mean, we think it fundamentally misconceived. "Injury in fact"
reflects the statutory requirement that a person be "adversely
affected" or "aggrieved," and it serves to distinguish a person
with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation--even though
small-from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We
have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs
with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a frac-
iton of a vote.., a five dollar fine and costs.., and a $1.50
274. Id. at 2411.
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more for
finished products, that each of its members uses the forests, rivers, streams, mountains,
and other natural resources both surrounding the Washington metropolitan area
and . . . his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing and other
recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses have been adversely
affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its members breathes the air
within the Washington metropolitan area and the area of his legal residence and
that this air has suffered increased pollution caused by the modified rate structure,
and that each member has been forced to pay increased taxes because of the sums
which must be expended to dispose of otherwise reusable waste materials.
Id. at 2411.
275. Id. at 2416.
276. Id. at 2417.
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poll tax .... While these cases were not dealing specifically with
§ 10 of the APA, we see no reason to adopt a more restructure
interpretation of "adversely affected" or "aggrieved." As Pro-
fessor Davis has put it: "The basic idea that comes out in
numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for stand-
ing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis
for standing and the principle supplies the motivation. 277
Therefore, it is clear that any citizens' group can challenge an
agency that fails to file an impact statement where it appears that one
should be filed. All the group need show is "injury in fact" using the
guidelines in Sierra Club and SCRAP, because the "zone of interests"
test is satisfied by showing a failure to file the statement.
It is not so clear, however, what a citizens' group should do if an
agency has filed an impact statement and is going ahead with the project
in spite of a conclusion in the impact statement that the action to be
undertaken will have a detrimental environmental effect. As mentioned
previously, NEPA, by its terms, only requires the agency to consider
the environmental effects of its action in the total cost-benefit analysis
of the project .27  There is no affirmative duty for a federal agency to
abandon a project which will have a detrimental effect.279
277. Id. at 2417 n.14.
278. See note 236 supra and accompanying text. See also Conservation Council v.
Froelke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (preparation of impact statement held sufficient to
allow continuation of a dam project the cost of which exceeded its benefit) ; Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (impact state-
ment for the Tennessee Tambigbee waterway held to satisfy the requirements of NEPA);
Citizens Airport Comm. v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va. 1972) (impact statement for
airport satisfies NEPA even though it provides no solution for environmental problems the
airport would create).
279. It now appears that the trend is to subject the agency's action to judicial review.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972),
plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin completion of a flood control project. The project was
enjoined by the district court after it found that the Corps had failed to prepare an impact
statement. When the Corps finally presented the statement to the district court, the court
dissolved the injunction. Plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit on the basis that NEPA
had not been complied with in that (1) the statement was deficient and (2) the adminis-
trative determination by the Corps that the dam should be constructed was reviewable by
the court on the merits.
The Eighth Circuit held that the impact statement was objectively prepared and that
it sufficiently presented alternative courses of action. But the court backed away from the
district court's holding that NEPA requires agency officials to be selectively impartial. The
court stated that NEPA assumes as inevitable an institutional bias in favor of the project
and "erects the procedural requirement of § 4332 to insure 'that there is no way [the deci-
sion-maker] can fail to note . . .'" the environmental consequences of its action. Id. at 295,
citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
As to the lower court's holding that the agency's decision to proceed with the project
was not subject to judicial review, the court of appeals disagreed.
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that the Act
is more than an environmental full disclosure law. NEPA was intended to effect
substantial changes in decision making. . . . § 101 [§ 4331] sets out specific environ-
mental goals to serve as a set of policies to guide agency action affecting the environ-
ment. . . . The procedures included in § 102 [§ 43321 of NEPA are not ends in
themselves. They are intended to be "action forcing."
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One problem is whether the citizens' group will have standing to
challenge the agency's action as inconsistent with the impact statement.
Assuming the group makes the required Sierra Club showing that its
members will be injured in fact if the project is completed, the zone of
interests test must still be satisfied. Because section 102(c) of NEPA
does not require an agency to abandon a environmentally detrimental
action so long as an impact statement is filed, it cannot be said that the
failure to follow the mandate of the impact statement is an injury fall-
ing within the zone of interests that the statute was designed to protect.8 °
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive requirement of the
Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency de-
cisions on the merits. Whether we look to common law or the Administrative Pro-
ceedure Act, absent "legislative guidance as to reviewability, and administrative
determination affecting legal rights is reviewable unless some special reason appears
for not reviewing." Here, important legal rights are affected. NEPA is silent as to
judicial review, and no special reasons appear for not reviewing the decision of
the agency. To the contrary, the prospect of substantive review should improve
the quality of agency decisions and should make it more likely that the broad
purposes of NEPA will be realized.
Id. at 297-99 (citations omitted). This decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit in a per
curiam decision in Conservation Counsel v. Froelke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). But see
Bradford Township v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972);
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). See also National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ; Calvert Cliff's
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preserv.
Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
While the Eighth Circuit would review the merits of an agency's decision under the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, the Tenth Circuit is in disagreement. In National He-
lium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), the court found an impact statement
prepared by the Secretary of the Interior to be sufficient after applying the following tests:
(1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural requirements of NEPA.
(2) Whether the environmental impact statement constitutes an objective good faith
compliance with the demands of NEPA.
(3) Whether the statement contains a reasonable discussion of the subject matter
involved in the five reviewed areas.
Although not clear from its opinion, the court seemed to refuse to review the agency's
decision on its merits. As stated in a concurring opinion by Judge Breitenstein:
I believe that judicial review of an impact statement is limited to a determination
of whether the statement is a good faith, objective and reasonable presentation of
the subject areas mandated by NEPA. The courts should not second-guess the
scientists, experts, economists and planners who make the environmental statement.
Id. at 1006.
Apparently the Ninth Circuit has also decided that a decision by an agency to proceed
with a project after a sufficient impact statement has been filed is not reviewable on the
merits. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), the
court commented in a footnote that,
We do not read the National Environmental Protection Act to give to the
courts the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove construction of a properly
authorized project where an adequate EIS has been prepared and circulated in ac-
cordance with the NEPA requirements . . . . We have taken the view that final
judgments of project justification are not subject to review in an action to consider
the adequacy of an EIS statement under NEPA. Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians
v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1973). Congress in reauthorizing the
project and in determining whether to proceed in the light of the EIS must consider
many other factors in addition to the environmental effects. These questions are
not before us and properly so.
Id. at 822 n.13.
280. See note 269 supra and accompanying text.
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However, the policy statement in section 101281 of the Act says, inter
alia, that "each person should enjoy a healthful environment .... 11282 It
could be argued that the failure of an agency to follow the mandate of
its own impact statement is "an injury within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the statute."
This argument must, to a certain extent, hinge on whether section
101 creates a public right, at least for the limited purpose of finding
standing. There are only two federal district court cases which have con-
sidered this question, and, although both hold that section 101 does not
create private substantive rights, neither addresses itself to the question
of standing to sue a federal agency. In Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp.,28"
private individuals sought five million dollars in damages due to in-
juries from air pollutants emitted by defendant's factories. The court
found that section 2284 did not create a substantive right to a clean en-
vironment since Congress made no mention of rights, duties or reme-
dies. 85 Based on this reasoning the court also found that section
101 (c) 2 18 and (b) 287 did not create substantive rights.288 As to section
101 (c) 289 the court said
[T]hese words are almost precatory in nature. Had the Con-
gress intended to create a positive and enforceable legal right or
duty, it would have said so, and would not have limited itself
to words of entreaty. In absence of any clear statement, this
Court must assume that no such intention existed. Although
such a reading stands by itself as the only plausible construc-
tion, it is interesting to note that it is supported by the legisla-
tive history of the provision in question. Originally, the Senate
version, Senate Bill 1075, provided that "(t)he Congress recog-
nizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right
to a healthful environment.... However, these strong words
did not survive the conference committee, where they were
deleted lest they be interpreted to create legal consequences
which the Congress did not intend. 0'
In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,2 1 a district court refused to find that
281. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
283. 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
285. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972), citing J.I.
Case Co. v. Borok, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Okla. 1946).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
287. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
288. Here the court cited Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325
F. Supp. 728, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971), which has been reversed in part by Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972.)
289. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970).
290. Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 538-39 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (emphasis
added).
291. 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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minor decisions involved in running an airport constituted "major fed-
eral action." In passing, the district judge stated: "Moreover, I do not
interpret § 101 of the Act as creating any substantive private right." ' 2
Yet, it may not be necessary to show a substantive right to a clean
environment in order to have standing if the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps or Engineers2 3 is followed.
There the court argued that section 102 (c) 2 94 is not only a procedural
requirement for agencies, but it is intended to be "action forcing" in re-
quiring agencies to act within the guidelines of section 101.211 The ques-
tion of the plaintiff's standing was not raised in this decision, probably
because the plaintiff had originally sued to enjoin a project where no
impact statement had been prepared. After the statement was submitted
by the Corps, the district court dissolved the injunction. The plaintiff
appealed, asking for review on the merits of the Corps' decision and also
claiming that the statement was insufficient. Because it is clear that a
citizen has standing to challenge the sufficiency of a report he has a right
to receive, the question of plaintiff's standing as to the question of judicial
review on the merits may have been overlooked.
Even if a citizens' group cannot satisfy the "zone of interests" test
under NEPA, there are ways to avoid it. For instance, if the proposed
federal action will have the effect of violating standards under the Clean
Air Act29 or the Water Quality Act,297 then the group can claim viola-
tion of a substantive right under those acts, which give private citizens
standing to sue.298 Alleging these acts, in concert with NEPA, should
fulfill the requirement of the test. If, however, the environmental qual-
ities which will be affected by the agency action are aesthetic, then,
absent some special provision in the agency's enabling act,2 9 there is
no federal act which creates a substantive right to aesthetic quality, and
the zone of interests test may preclude judicial review."'
292. Id. at 578.
293. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). See note 279 supra.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
296. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
297. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
298. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2 (Supp. 1973).
299. Cf. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
300. A bill, H.R. 7592, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), to amend NEPA to include a pro-
vision for citizen's suits is opposed by Alan G. Kirk, II, acting administrator for enforce-
ment and general counsel of the EPA, because be thinks the bill would give private citizens
the primary role in enforcement of agency standards. He thinks that citizens should be able
to sue only after state and federal agencies are notified of a violation and take no action.
Congressman Paul N. McCloskey (R.-Cal.) argues that the role of the private citizen
in enforcement could be lessened if the public could maintain a high degree of faith in the
regulatory process. In view of the "Watergate Affair" and the subsequent revolving leader-
ship in the Justice Department, his argument is well taken.
The bill purports to grant standing in environmental suits to persons who are adversely
affected by an action or "who speak knowingly of environmental values." Suits brought
under the bill would have to be supported by the affidavits of at least two persons who are
technically qualified and who state that the activity which is the subject of the suit would
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4. COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING HOUSING
There have been several recent cases involving the application of
NEPA to HUD-financed developments.8"' While most of the cases in-
volve failure to file impact statements, one did consider the question of
the adequacy of a statement submitted. In San Francisco Tomorrow v.
Romney, °2 the Ninth Circuit found that there was no major federal ac-
tion and, hence, no requirement to file an impact statement. Funds had
been advanced by HUD in 1962 so that a study could be made for a
redevelopment project. The original plan was submitted to HUD in 1964
and was finally approved by the City of San Francisco and by HUD
in 1966.
HUD retained rights to monitor the project and make amendatory
grants to defray rising costs. The plaintiffs argued that the subsequent
decisions by HUD pursuant to these retained rights constituted major
federal action. The court disagreed. It held that the major federal action
was the original decision to make the grant and loan. Since the only
purpose of the retention of right was to ensure that the project would
be completed as expected, the decisions made thereunder did not con-
stitute major federal action. The court further held that such retention
of rights did not make NEPA retroactive to the original decision date. 0
impair environmental quality. A registry would be established of persons "interested in
environmental quality" who would be notified of suits in particular regions.
Under the bill, the citizens could sue to enforce existing standards, or, if no standards
exist, courts could enjoin activity if either (1) the environmental and economic costs of the
action outweigh the benefit or (2) if the purpose of the activity could be accomplished in
a reasonable alternative manner. 4 ENvni. REP., CURRENT DEVS. 1068 (Oct. 26, 1973).
One must question the utility of the proposed bill. It is not certain whether Congress
can grant standing to persons "who speak knowingly of environmental value" in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Standing is
a court made rule designed to limit cases brought before the courts to those involving people
with a real interest, economic or aesthetic, that has been invaded. Another problem is the
provision which grants the courts power to enjoin the proposed action when the costs out-
weigh the benefits. How are such environmental costs to be measured? Doesn't this provi-
sion simply substitute the court's judgment for that of the federal agency, which admittedly
has more expertise in its domain? See Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Natural Environ-
ment Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
301. See, e.g., Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (Ist Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club
v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021
(9th Cir. 1973) ; Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
302. 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973).
303. NEPA may be applied to ongoing projects if the court can find a decision or act
to be made by a federal agency which constitutes major federal action. If the court does
find that section 4332(2)(c) is applicable, then it will determine if it is "practicable" for
the agency to prepare an impact statement. If the project is so far along that preparation
of a statement would serve no purpose, then the court will use its equitable powers and
refuse to grant the injunction. Thus, it is not a question of whether NEPA should be applied
retroactively, but a question of whether there is a major federal action. See, e.g., Ragland
v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972) (act inapplicable where only 4 miles of a 20 mile
segment of highway remain to be completed); Concerned Citizens v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 332
(3d Cir. 1972) (act does not apply where federal decision made before effective date of
NEPA); Green County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (NEPA applies
to all major federal actions taken after January 1, 1970); Named Individual Members of
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In Silva v. Romney,"°4 a federal district court in Massachusetts
enjoined HUD from giving any assistance to a housing project until an
environmental impact statement was filed. HUD had been asked to pro-
vide and had approved a mortgage guarantee in the amount of $4,000,-
000 and an interest grant of $156,000 for the project, but the closing
had not taken place. Evidence of a controversy over the project's drain-
age facilities between HUD officials and the owners of adjacent prop-
erty was sufficient to establish that the project was controversial within
a department guideline defining "major federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment."
80 5
While the district court enjoined the agency from further action, 08
it did not so enjoin the private developer who proceeded to cut down
trees on about three acres of the tract. Plaintiffs then filed a "Motion for
Relief Preserving Status Quo" to temporarily enjoin the developer's ac-
tion until HUD filed its impact statement. The district court declined to
grant the injunction, presumably because it thought it was without the
power to prevent the developer from "doing as he wishes" with his own
property. The court was obviously persuaded by the First Circuit's opin-
ion in City of Boston v. Volpe"°' where that court said that "agencies
may be subject to duties concerning a proposed federal action at a time
when an applicant may not yet be enjoined from activity on his own."
08
On appeal the First Circuit per Chief Judge Coffin reversed. 09 City
of Boston was distinguished from the present case because the adminis-
trative process had gone no further than an intra-agency tenative allo-
cation of funds. Here the agency's allocation of funds had been finally
approved, subject only to the closing which had not yet taken place.
Since the arrangements had reached the point where the federal govern-
ment became a "partner" with the potential grantee, the court held that
the district court had the power to issue the injunction. The case was
remanded to give the developer an opportunity to present evidence of
the possibility of injury to him if the injunction was issued.
While not necessary to its decision, the court made a plea to federal
agencies to draft "status quo" regulations to guide agencies, private de-
velopers, and the general public whenever proposed "major federal ac-
tions" are involved. 10 As demonstrated in the instant case, prepartner-
San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1971);
Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972) (requirement of section 4332(2) (c)
must be enforced by injunction whenever the proposed project poses a substantial risk of
damage to the environment and there exists a reasonable possibility of alternative action,
unless there are extraordinary equities on the side of the government).
304. 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
305. Id. at 784.
306. Id.
307. 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
308. Id. at 258.
309. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
310. Id. at 288.
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ship regulations are in the interests of all parties concerned. The gov-
ernment has an enormous investment in complying with the terms of
NEPA, both in time and money. This interest could be materially dam-
aged if the private developer were able to proceed with actions that
could damage the environment.81'
In the instant case HUD agreed to fund a project and was then re-
quired to file an impact statement before final funding could be granted.
If the developer had been allowed to proceed with his actions, there is
a possibility that the environment would have been harmed. Had the
impact statement revealed that the project would have an adverse effect
on the environment, the agency could have withdrawn its funds from
the project. The result could have been an environment damaged by
the developer's action, an incompleted housing project due to the with-
drawal of the agency's funds and a host of unnecessary expenses for both
the developer and the agency. 12
Preplanning guidelines would be a better solution to the problem
than piecemeal court action, while still controlling the private developer.
Such guidelines would extend to all developers planning projects which
could involve major federal action. As the court in Silva noted, the power
of a court to enjoin private action, when there is the possibility of veto-
ing the project due to an adverse impact statement, should not depend
on technicalities, such as whether a contract has been signed with the
agency.818 Also, the guidelines would make a private developer more
aware of the effect his proposed project would have on the environment
before he begins. This result would be in accord with NEPA's policy
declaration of preservation of the environment. 14 It is obvious that this
result cannot be reached without integrated planning between the public
sector, which is directly under NEPA's mandate, and the private sector,
which is not.
These cases demonstrate the extent to which the section 102 re-
quirement has been extended. They should serve as a warning to all
land developers to analyze their projects in terms of whether there is
any federal action involved and whether such action is of sufficient size
to justify the preparation of an impact statement. As an injunction can
be economically damaging, it would be wise for developers to assess the
environmental consequences of all large projects so that if there is fed-
eral action, the federal agency will be in a better position to make an
environmental assessment to decide whether an impact statement should
be prepared. The environmental data accumulated by the developer
could also be made available to the public. This disclosure could help
prevent bad feelings which lead to citizen's suits, and could also be used






5. CONTENTS OF THE IMPACT STATEMENT
a. Rules
The EPA has issued proposed rules 15 covering the contents of the
impact statements. Briefly, they are:
(a) The description of the proposed action.
(b) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
(c) Adverse impact which cannot be avoided should the pro-
posal be implemented.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.
(e) Relationship between local short term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long
term productivity.
(f) Irreversible and unretrievable commitment of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented.
(g) A discussion of problems and objectives raised by other
Federal, State and local agencies and by private organiza-
tions and individuals in the review process.816
The EPA reasserts the proposition that
[i]mpact statements shall not be justification documents for
proposed agency funding or actions. Rather, they shall be ob-
jective evaluations of actions and their alternatives in light
of all environmental considerations. Environmental impact
statements shall be prepared using a systematic inter-disciplin-
ary approach. Statements shall incorporate all relevant ana-
lytical disciplines and shall provide meaningful and factual
data, information, and analysis. The presentation should be
simple and concise, yet all facts necessary to permit indepen-
dent evaluation and appraisal of the beneficial and adverse
environmental effects of alternative actions. Statements shall
not be drafted in a style which requires extensive scientific or
technical expertise to comprehend and evaluate the environ-
mental impact of an Agency action.317
b. Case Law
Prior to the promulgation of the proposed rules, the contents of im-
pact statements had been discussed in several cases. 818 The statements
315. 40 C.F.R. part 6 (1973). See also Kross, Preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 81 (1972); CEQ Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973).
316. 37 Fed. Reg. 883 (1972).
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (failure to discuss alternatives); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,
463 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (responsible opposing views must be presented); Calvert
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were attacked mainly for lack of objectivity, which consisted of failure
to give all the facts and failure to consider viable alternative causes of
action.819
When these decisions are read together with the proposed rules.2°
and CEQ guidelines,8 2 ' it is clear that impact statements must meet the
following requirements: (1) The statement must not contain unsup-
ported conclusions. Any conclusions in the statement must be supported
by facts from which a reasonable objective observer would reach the
same results;3 22 (2) the reasonable alternatives presented may not be
deemphasized by the agency in an attempt to justify its course of action.
The statement must contain a text of reasonable alternatives with an ac-
companying discussion of the environmental impact of each one. The
depth of the discussion is governed by a "rule of reason" which weighs
the depth of evaluation in proportion to the degree of impact. 28
c. Who Must Prepare the Statement
The federal agencies and the courts have different views as to who
must prepare the statement. The leading case is Green County Planning
Board v. FPC,24 in which the Second Circuit held that the FPC must
prepare its own statement and could not rely on the applicant to do so.
This case made it clear that the burden of preparing the statement is
on the agency. However, prospective applicants should be aware that
the proposed rules require them to submit an "environmental assess-
ment" statement before the agency will decide whether or not to issue
the grant. 25 The cost burden of the additional engineering consultant
time required to make the assessment will be shared by the agency and
the applicant in a proportion matching that of the grant to the cost of
the whole project. 2 6
Also, Greene County has not been uniformly followed by the courts.
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Ark. 1972) (statement must be
objective, it cannot be slanted by the agency); City of New York v. United States, 337
F. Supp. 150, aff'd on rehearing, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (phrase "to the fullest
extent possible" is not intended to permit agencies to shirk obligation of section); Kalur
v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971) (Corps of Engineers cannot rely on state water
standards but must perform own study).
319. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
320. 37 Fed. Reg. 879 (1972).
321. 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973).
322. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th
Cir. 1972) (the test of compliance with section 4332 is one of good faith objectivity rather
than subjective impartiality) ; Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) (conclusory
statement must be supported).
323. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Fund v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
324. 445 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
325. 37 Fed. Reg. 881 (1972).
326. Id.
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For example, in Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Volpe, 27
the Eighth Circuit held that NEPA was satisfied by the Federal High-
way Administration's review, modification, and adoption of a federal-aid
highway project's environmental impact statement that was initially pre-
pared by a state highway agency.
6. PROBLEMS OF NEPA
NEPA is deficient in a number of respects, but in relation to land
use, its greatest shortcoming is that it is not adequate as a planning de-
vice. While the requirement of an impact statement for ecologically con-
troversial federal actions may prevent ecological disasters (such as a
jetport being built in the Great Cypress Swamp, or an extension of the
Florida Canal System), the Act itself does not provide the mechanism
for the solution of the fundamental problem: the lack of a homogeneous
land use plan. The reason NEPA is deficient in this respect is twofold.
First, the Act applies only to "federal action."32 'Although this text has
shown that a large percentage of private enterprise may be tied to fed-
eral action, as by federal licensing and funding, 2 9 a great many land use
decisions are not. It is conceivable that NEPA's reach could be extended
through judicial decisions beyond the limits provided in the CEQ guide-
lines. It is arguable that wherever the acts of private persons are fed-
erally regulated, an impact statement should be filed, even though the
federal agency makes no decision itself. This could be supported by hold-
ing the decision made in promulgating the regulation to be sufficient to
support the requirement for an impact statement when private action is
taken pursuant to the regulation. Such a result, analagous to the exten-
sion of the Interstate Commerce clause830 to Ollie's Barbecue,8 ' would
cover most projects in the public sector, although the costs of filing im-
pact statements would be enormous. Thus, it is likely that the concept
of major federal action will not be extended much further than presently
provided by the CEQ guidelines.
The second reason that NEPA is inadequate as a planning device
for land use is that it adopts a piecemeal approach to environmental pro-
tection. As mentioned in the introduction, fragmentation is one of the
causes of environmental harm, particularly in the aesthetic degradation
of our cities."3 2 A project-by-project analysis does not provide positive
land planning. Like nuisance,3 3 it merely serves to negate the worst
327. 487 F.2d 849, 853-54 (8th Cir. 1973) (excellent discussion of state agency's duty
to prepare impact statement).
328. See section III, A, 2, a supra.
329. Id.
330. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
331. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
332. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
333. See section II, A, 2 supra.
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project and will let the others "slide" through the agency's cost-benefit
analysis.
Perhaps the greatest problem with NEPA's requirement for an im-
pact statement is that it imposes enormous costs on agency action which
may not be offset by a commensurate benefit to the environment.8 4 Since
the Act does not require that agencies abandon projects which are shown
to be deterimental to the environment,"' 5 it is arguable that the Act has
degenerated into a requirement for a "rubber stamp" document. The
Act requires only that the impact statement be included as a part of the
agency's cost-benefit analysis of the project. There may already be a
built in bias in the agency in favor of the project,83 6 and, if so, the
agency could undervalue the cost of whatever degradation of the envi-
ronment is involved, since many aspects of the environment, such as
aesthetic beauty are almost impossible to value in terms of dollars.
8 7
Also, if the only control over abuse of agency discretion is a citizen's
suit challenging the sufficiency of the impact statement, then effective
advertising by special interest groups may curtail the incentive of such
groups to file suit. For example, in view of the present energy shortage,
oil companies are advertising that anti-pollution controls account for
9% of all energy used in the United States 88 This advertising is meant
to blunt the demand for clean air in favor of less gasoline use. What the
advertisement fails to mention, however, is that if automobile weight
was reduced, then more than enough gasoline could be saved to offset
that which is needed for pollution control. Moreover if citizens do sue,
the court must find an abuse of discretion by the agency before it can
reverse the decision to go ahead with the project. 8 It is unclear, absent
a collateral statute, whether proceeding with a project in the face of an
adverse impact statement should constitute an abuse of discretion.84°
334. The statement, posing as it does controversial issues, has also led to demand
for hearings even where the statute does not so provide. Agencies, as presently con-
stituted, may not have expert staffs versed in the ecology of their fields. Since impact
statements can degenerate into conventional boiler-plate, there will be a need for
improving these staffs.
On the other hand, there is already a claim that the demands made upon the
impact statement may become excessive. The most controversial and open-ended
statutory requirement is that the statement must report on alternatives to the pro-
posed action. There is a sense in which the alternatives to proposed action are
infinite depending on how the end in view is stated.
Jaffe, Ecological Goals and the Ways and Means of Achieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 1,
27 (1972). See also Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
335. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. But see Calvert Cliff's Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf.
v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
336. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
337. Id.
338. 3 ENVnI. REP. CURRENT DEVs. 1314 (March 2, 1973).
339. See cases cited in note 255, supra.
340. Id.
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B. Other Federal Laws
There are three other recent federal environmental laws which af-
fect land use. They are, the Clean Air Act of 1970,41 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972,42 and the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972.148 And, as previously mentioned, a National
Land Use Act844 has now passed the Senate and is under consideration in
the House of Representatives.
1. POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS
The Clean Air and Water Acts are both designed to abate pollu-
tion. They are similar in that both have effluent control standards for
point sources;345 both have provisions for citizens' suits; 846 and both
give the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency the
power "to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his
functions under this Act." '47 An analysis of the application of the Ad-
ministrator's regulatory power under the Clean Air Act provides an
example of how land-use management is tied to the problem of both air
and water quality control.
Air pollution is primarily caused by the incomplete conversion of
fuel into energy and the emission of the unconverted fuel into the air.
The amount of pollution depends on (1) the type of fuel used, (2) the
efficiency of the conversion process, (3) the efficiency of the steps taken
to inhibit the unburned particles from escaping into the air, and (4) the
number of sources, stationary or mobile, which carry on the process.
84 8
Once the causes of air pollution are known, abatement procedures
can be prescribed. First, the polluting source can change from a dirty
341. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
342. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
343. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
344. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
345. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (Supp. 1973) provides:
(a) Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318,
1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall
be unlawful.
(b) In order to carry out the objective of this chapter there shall be achieved-
(1) (A) not later than July 1, 1977, effluent limitations for point sources, other
than publicly owned treatment works (B) which shall require the applica-
tion of the best practicable control technology currently available as de-
fined by the Administrator pursuant to section 1314(6) of this title ...
(2) (A) not later than July 1, 1983, effluent limitations for categories and
classes of point sources, other than publicly owned treatment works, which
(B) shall require the application of the best available technology eco-
nomically available for such category or class toward the national goal of
elimination of all pollutants ....
See also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857f-Sa to f-6e (Supp. 1973) (relating to emission control for motor
vehicles).
346. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2 (Supp. 1973).
347. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1361a (Supp. 1973); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857g (Supp. 1973).
348. 3 ENvni. REP. CURRENT DEVS. 102 (1972).
19731
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
fuel to a clean fuel. The problem with this procedure is that the demand
for clean fuel will increase beyond the available supply, thus causing
shortages and price increases. The recent energy crisis has amply dem-
onstrated this point, as sources which converted from coal to oil will be
forced to reconvert as the supply of oil becomes limited."4 9 One can
only wonder whether the crisis would have been averted if the price of
oil had not been held artificially low by the government, because a change
to more efficient smoke stack pollution control devices might have ac-
complished the same result as converting to a cleaner fuel.
A second possible approach would be to increase the conversion
ratio of energy produced to fuel burned. For example, most generators
in conventional power plants have a ratio of only 40%. 5 ° If the ratio
could be increased, less fuel could be used to produce the same amount
of energy, and less fuel burned means less air pollution. However, the
problem with increasing the conversion ratio is the great amount of
research and time required to effectuate it. Thus, this method of abate-
ment will pay off in the years ahead but will not accomplish an immedi-
ate improvement in the quality of the air.
The third alternative, the use of control devices such as smokestack
controls and catalytic converters in automobiles, has limits because they
lower the conversion ratio, discussed above. Spokesmen for the oil in-
dustry now estimate that pollution control devices will account for up
to nine percent of the total energy demand by 1985.351 While this esti-
mate may be high, no responsible person will dispute the claim that the
emission controls do use a significant amount of energy.
Perhaps the most promising method of achieving environmental
quality control is to decrease the number of pollution-causing sources.
This method is tied to land-use planning and can be easily demonstrated
by the new EPA regulation 312 for enforcement of the Clean Air Stand-
ards. The regulations provide for a review by responsible state pollution
control agencies of all construction projects which may generate a sig-
nificant amount of automobile traffic. The affected facilities are high-
ways, roads, parking lots, garages, shopping centers, recreational cen-
ters, amusement parks, sports stadiums, airports, commercial and in-
dustrial development and all other traffic-generating sources.8 53 The
regulations are not designed to curtail the building of such facilities, but
to control their placement in such a way as to minimize the number of
349. 3 ENViR. REP. CURRENT DEVS. 1220 (1973).
350. Weaver & Kristof, The Search for Tomorrow's Power, 142 NAT'L. GEoGRAPHIC 650,
675 (1972).
351. 3 ENviR. REP. CUaRNT DaVS. 1314 (March 2, 1973).
352. Regulations for states to carry out pre-construction reviews of indirect air pollution
sources were proposed by the EPA. 38 Fed. Reg. 29893 (1973).
353. State review procedures would apply to designated and non-designated areas. A
designated area is one which could exceed any air quality standard for the next 10 years.
The EPA estimates that about 350 shopping centers and 150 parking lots would be subject
to review. 4 ENVmR. REP. CURRENT DzVs. 1093 (1973). See generally 40 C.F.R. part 52 (1973).
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vehicular miles traveled. This reduction means a corresponding reduc-
tion in the consumption of gasoline, which leads to a reduction in auto-
mobile emissions.
While this result is beneficial in terms of air quality control, it is
questionable whether these regulations can be justified on the basis of a
cost-benefit type of analysis from the point of view of a land planner.
As will be shown in the discussion of state-land use laws and regula-
tions,8 4 there are myriad state and local land-use regulations, most of
which are unrelated in purpose. The interjection of additional agencies
in the permitting process is an extra cost that will be added to the facil-
ity being constructed. In addition, the increase in the degree of frag-
mentation of the governmental decision process increases the possibility
of conflicting requirements by two or more agencies which might cause
the abandonment of the proposed project, a result the regulations were
never intended to have.
855
In addition to the problem of fragmentation, the regulations do not
provide for the positive type of land planning which could eliminate
the problem in the first place. In contrast, a regional planning agency
with broad powers could anticipate demand for shopping facilities and
work with private developers to find the most appropriate site, rather
than merely having the power to reject a proposal to build a shopping
center on a particular piece of land. Furthermore, such an agency could
coordinate the building of suburban communities with the development
of public transit systems between such communities and business dis-
tricts. The end result would be the same as that which the present regu-
lations accomplish, a reduction of automobile emissions. But, in addi-
tion, interdisciplinary land planning could also provide aesthetic and
recreational benefits which cannot be achieved by simple pollution con-
trol standards. While the present regulations are a step in the right di-
rection, it is evident that without broader land use regulations, the
problem of achieving optimal air and water quality will increase.
2. LAND PLANNING LAWS
The coastal zone, defined as the area in which coastal waters and
adjacent shoreland strongly affect each other, 58 has been recognized as
a fragile ecological system which is extremely vulnerable to the detri-
mental impact of man's activities.' 7 In response to a growing concern
over the degradation of this area by overuse, Congress enacted the
354. Section IV infra.
355. Russell Train, the interim administrator of the EPA, stressed that the proposed
regulations are not predicated on a no growth policy. 4 Em. REP. CURRENT DEV's 1093
(Nov. 2, 1973).
356. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453a (Supp. 1973).
357. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (Supp. 1973). See Comment, Land-Use Management in Dela-
ware's Coastal Zone, 6 J. LAw REFoRm 233 (1972).
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Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.351 The Act provides for federal
funding assistance to the coastal states that develop management pro-
grams in accord with the guidelines set out in the Act. 89 In order to ob-
tain funding, a state must show that it has developed a coordinated pro-
gram which includes input from local, state, and regional sources.8 ° It
must demonstrate that a single agency has the power to generally admin-
ister the act, designate certain coastal areas for preservation, and con-
demn such designated land to the public use.86' The most interesting re-
quirement is that the state demonstrate that the agency has the power,
directly or indirectly, to regulate both land and water use in the coastal
zone. 62 This is directly at odds with the traditional approach of vesting
zoning and similar regulatory power in local political entities." 3 Obvi-
ously, this requirement is meant to curtail the political abuses which have
been so evident in the implementation of zoning laws. It is questionable,
however, whether a zoning program set up under state control would
cure the abuses present in local level administration since the effective-
ness of such a program must finally depend on the local officials ad-
ministering the program.
IV. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AFFECTING LAND USE
A. California Follows NEPA (CEQA)
1. INITIAL PROBLEMS
California became the first state to consider a NEPA-type statute
when the California Environmental Quality Act was introduced in the
California legislature in April of 1970 (CEQA). 64 Because of the con-
358 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
359. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454b (Supp. 1973).
360. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455c (Supp. 1973).
361. 16 U.S C.A. § 1455d (Supp. 1973).
362. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455e (Supp. 1973) provides:
(e) Prior to granting approval, the Secretary shall also find that the program pro-
vides:
(1) for any one or a combination of the following geneVal techniques for con-
trol of land and water uses within the coastal zone;
(A) state establishment of criteria and standards for local implementation,
subject to administrative review and enforcement of compliance;
(B) direct state land and water use planning and regulation; or
(C) state administrative review for consistency with the management pro-
gram of all development plans, projects, or land and water use regula-
tions, including exceptions and variances thereto, proposed by any
state or local authority or private developer, with power to approve or
disapprove after public notice and an opportunity for hearings.
(2) for a method of assuring that local land and water use regulations within
the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude land and water
uses of regional benefit.
363. See section II supra.
364. California A.B. 2045 was introduced by its author, Assemblyman John Knox, on
April 2, 1970. It is interesting to note that while the California Act was being debated and
amended, Puerto Rico passed its Public Policy Environmental Act in June of 1970, as a near
verbatim version of NEPA Public Policy Environmental Act, 12 L.P.R A. §§ 1121-27 (1970).
This act became effective July 1, 1970.
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troversy surrounding the bill, it was not signed into law until Septem-
ber." 5 During that interim period numerous versions were considered
and amended. These amendments such as the simple change of the word
"program" to "project" were to assume considerable importance as was
seen in the case of Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors!6"
CEQA is divided into four chapters. The first two merely set out the
legislative intent and policy." 7 The last two are the operative chapters
which deal with state agencies, boards and commissions, as well as local
agencies.""'
Section 21100 is the very heart of the operative portion of the Act
and it provides that,
all state agencies, boards, and commissions *** shall prepare
or cause to be prepared by contract, and certify the completion
of an environmental impact report on any project they propose
to carry out... or approve which may have a significant effect
on the environment.... Such a report shall include a detailed
statement setting forth the following. 9
The section sets forth six elements or factors that must be considered
in this detailed environmental impact report. 70 Five were copied ver-
batim from NEPA, 7' the only addition being a requirement that the
impact report set forth mitigation measures proposed to minimize the
impact. 72 Where NEPA requires a detailed environmental statement in
"major federal actions," 8' CEQA, on its face, only requires an impact
report on "projects" agencies propose to carry out.874 Since CEQA was
not approved until September of 1970, the Interim Guidelines of NEPA
had already been adopted. 75 In those Interim Guidelines, "actions"
365. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21051 (West
1970). This Act was approved on September 18, 1970, and is now amended as CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West Supp. 1974). The amended version was approved and filed
on December 5, 1972, to be effective immediately as an urgency statute.
366. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Friends of Mammoth]. This is the opinion as modified. See the original opinion at 104 Cal.
Rptr. 16 (1972).
367. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE, §§ 21000-001 and § 21050
(West Supp. 1974).
368. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE, §§ 21100-107 and
§§ 21150-51 (West Supp. 1974).
369. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West Supp.
1974).
370. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100(a)-(f) (West
Supp. 1974).
371. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100(a), (b), (d),
(e), and (f) (West Supp. 1974), is identical to NEPA's 42 U.S.C. § 4332(i)-(v).
372. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100(c) (West Supp.
1974).
373. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
374. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West Supp.
1974).
375. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
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was defined to include among other things, three types of "projects":
(1) those "projects" directly undertaken by the federal government;
(2) those "projects" financed by the federal government; (3) and those
"projects" which required some type of federal approval. 76 Conse-
quently, the choice of the word "projects" by the California legislature,
rather than the word "actions" which was used in NEPA, seems to be
intentional, particularly in light of the verbatim adoption of other parts
of NEPA. However, the conclusion could be drawn that the CEQA's
requirement to prepare an environmental impact report on "projects"
the agencies propose to carry out substantially mirrors NEPA's require-
ment for a detailed statement on "projects" and continuing activities
"directly undertaken by Federal Agencies." '8 "7 Except for this distinc-
tion, Chapter 3 of CEQA is generally in line with NEPA.
Chapter 4 of CEQA applies only to local agencies. It instructs state
agencies to require environmental impact reports from local agencies
prior to the allocation of funds to them where the local agency was
undertaking a project that may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment.8
78
Because CEQA was adopted prior to Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Commission v. AEC8K and Green County Planning Board v. FPC,8 0 it
contained many of NEPA's weaknesses. For example, no mention was
made of how data for the impact report should be collected or who
should actually bear the costs of preparation. While the federal interim
guidelines remedied some of the definitional weaknesses of NEPA within
three months of its enactment,88' it was more than two years before the
CEQA guidelines were adopted.8 2 This was the setting for Friends of
Mammoth.88
In Friends of Mammoth, a private developer applied for and was
granted a permit to build a relatively modest 184 unit condominium
complex in an undeveloped section of a rural county. The plaintiffs,
who were residents of the area, objected to its issuance and demanded
that the commission make an environmental impact report. Had the
county included a conservation element in its general plan, it would have
been absolutely exempted from making an impact statement under sec-
376. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 at ff 5(a) (1970).
377. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 at ff 5(a)(2) (1970).
378. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. Rrs. CODE § 21150 (West Supp.
1974). The one exception to this requirement is provided in § 21151, where the local agency
has adopted a conservation element in its general plan.
379. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Calvert Cliffs].
380. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Green County].
381. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
382. The Resources Agency of California adopted the Guidelines for Implementation
of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 on Feb. 5, 1973. 6 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 14, §§ 1500-15166 (1973).
383. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). See the original opinion
at 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
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tion 2115 1.184 Since the county had none, the key issue became whether
the local agency activity of granting a building permit to a private de-
veloper was equivalent to a "project [the agency] proposed to carry
out....""' Or more simply, was the issuance of a building permit by
a local agency a "project" for purposes of CEQA?88
Since the word "projects" rather than "actions" was specifically
chosen after the interim guidelines to NEPA had been approved, the
court's reasoning is questionable. Undoubtedly there are many who ap-
plaud the result, but even they must admit that the court stretched the
common sense meaning of the word "projects." In all fairness to the
court, it should be pointed out that in chapter 1 of CEQA, a non-opera-
tive chapter, the legislature declared its intent to be "that all agencies
of the state government which regulate activities of private individuals,
... shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to
preventing environmental damage.""' 7 But even that section was not
directly applicable, because no state agency was involved in the Friends
of Mammoth case.888
It is not within the scope of this article to examine the gyrations of
the court in arriving at its holding. Suffice it to say that lightning had
struck California: CEQA would henceforth require that all local gov-
ernmental agencies prepare environmental impact reports on any pri-
vate development that may have a significant effect on the environment
prior to the issuance of a building or zoning permit. By analogy, the
same would apply to any state agencies which issue permits or licenses
to private developers.
The court held that private construction projects were subject to
the impact report requirements of CEQA.
The first bolt hit California's freewheeling real estate developers
and mortgage lenders, 8 9 and then labor."' The reaction of local gov-
ernmental officials was near panic. Since the guidelines had not been
published yet, some counties and cities refused to issue building or zon-
ing permits of any kind.89' The magnitude of the additional burden
placed on state and local agencies by requiring them to prepare, com-
ment on, or review the environmental impact reports is best illustrated
384. See note 378 supra.
385. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp.
1974).
386. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104
Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
387. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West Supp.
1974).
388. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
389. TMi, Jan. 1, 1973, at 45.
390. See Tima, Jan. 1, 1973, at 45; Miami Herald, May 24, 1973, § D, at 1, col. 4.
391. See the draft work-paper for an address by Donald G. Hagman, URBAN LAW
A"NUAL, Annual Banquet, April 7, 1973 (Wash. Univ., St. Louis, Mo.); Santa Monica Eve-
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by the fact that Los Angeles alone had issued more than 45,000 building
permits in 1971.392
Consequently the Attorney General submitted a brief Amicus Curiae
in response to the petition for rehearing filed by the Board of Super-
visors of Mono County. Although the Attorney General admitted that
the court's holding had coincided with his position as Amicus Curiae,
he argued that because of the difficulties attendant upon the transition
toward full implementation, the holding should be prospective only.
3 9 3
On rehearing, the court did in fact modify its opinion 94 but refused
to adopt the Attorney General's argument and declined to apply the
decision prospectively only, on the grounds that developers were pro-
tected by either local statutes of limitations or the doctrine of laches3 95
The court even refused the Attorney General's request to stay the
effective date of their decision to give the government agencies an op-
portunity to gear up for full implementation of the Act. 96 In doing so,
the court made the incorrect and naive assumption that because govern-
mental agencies had been performing their duties in the public sector
prior to the decision, this experience in preparing environmental impact
statements would aid in solving the problems of implementation in the
private sector.97
The worst was not over for developers because one day after the
very limited modification in Friends of Mammoth, California's voters
approved an initiative to control all development within 1,000 feet of
California's entire coastline. 98
But conservationists should never underestimate political pressure
when, as California Lieutenant Governor Reinecke said: "Hundreds of
millions of dollars of construction are being stopped." 9 With that
caveat, it is interesting to note that Assemblyman John Knox, who had
been the principal author of CEQA, had already introduced a bill4 0 0 in
ning Outlook, Sept. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1, 1972, § C, at 8, col. 1;
TnmE, Jan. 1, 1973, at 45. San Jose, Los Angeles and the City of Walnut Creek either
stopped or held up different type permits, and all new construction was halted in Santa
Barbara County.
392. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1, 1972, § C, at 8, col. 1.
393. Brief for State of Cal. as Amicus Curiae at 3, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
394. On rehearing the court modified its original opinion, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972), by
several minor additions and by deleting footnote 10. That footnote had stated that although
the holding did not imply that an environmental impact report was actually required, the
particular project seemed to require one.
395. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 272, 502 P.2d 1049,
1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 778 (1972).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. The Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUrB. RES. CODE § 27000 el seq.
(West Supp. 1974); See TIME, Jan. 1, 1973, at 45.
399. TimF, Jan. 1. 1973, at 45.
400. A.B. 889. This bill was introduced in the 1972 regular session of the California
Legislature on March 13, 1972.
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March 1972 to amend CEQA only shortly after the California Supreme
Court had issued their order to hear the Friends of Mammoth case.
Consequently, all attention was directed to the legislature in its efforts
to amend the Act.
2. THE AMENDED CEQA
The Knox amendment was finally approved and was signed into
law effective December 5, 1972.41 The bill, as amended, is considerably
longer and more complex. The environmentalists complained 40 2 because
it provided for a four month moratorium on the application of the Act
to private projects. °3 On the other hand, the amendment did add a
degree of certainty. For example, various terms were defined, including
the word "project," which was defined to include all activities by gov-
ernmental agencies involving the issuance of leases, permits, licenses,
certificates or other entitlements for use to private developers.40 4 The
amendment also added a new element to be considered in the impact
report by requiring a statement which must discuss the growth-inducing
impact of the proposed action.40 5
The amendment also cleared up some ambiguities concerning the
collection of data. Whereas the federal courts in Calvert Cliffs 06 and
Green County"7 had held that the federal agencies must collect their
own data independently, section 21160 of CEQA now provides that the
governmental agency may require the applicant to submit data and in-
formation, or to actually prepare the environmental impact report. Sec-
tion 21089 answers the question of who should bear the costs incurred
in preparation of the report, for it provides that the governmental agency
may charge the applicant the reasonable costs of its preparation. The
economic consequence of this added cost to small developers may have
a catastrophic effect in terms of competitive advantage. Furthermore,
even though it is reasonable to assume that the large, well financed de-
velopers will be able to absorb this additional front-end cost, it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the cost will not be passed on to the
ultimate buyers or users of the development, particularly in light of any
reduced competition.
401. Letter from John D. Hoffman, Staff Attorney for the Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund, Inc. to John R. Dwyer, Jr., February 28, 1973.
402. Id.
403. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21171 (West Supp.
1974).
404. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (%Vest Supp.
1974). This essentially codified the holding in Friends of Mammoth, and expanded it to
include the permit granting activities of state agencies as well.
405. Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21100 (West Supp.
1974).
406. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
407. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Obviously there are costs associated with any legislation such as
CEQA, but it is for the legislature to decide when benefits outweigh
those costs. This issue is dependent upon whether the environmentally
beneficial effect of requiring the preparation of an impact report out-
weighs the total economic consequences: (1) to the governmental agency
involved in preparing or commenting on an environmental impact re-
port; (2) to the real estate, construction, and lending industries; (3) to
labor; and (4) to the ultimate consumer.
In analyzing the beneficial effects of the impact statements, one
other factor must be considered. None of the NEPA-type statutes pro-
vide citizens with a clear substantive right to enjoin an agency from
issuing a permit for a development that will cause irreparable and ir-
reversible harm to the environment, even when such adverse conse-
quences can be mitigated.4 18 If an agency prepares and considers a
thorough impact report, there apparently is no remedy for a citizen,
other than alleging that the agency official abused his discretion under
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 4°9 and similar state standards.
However, violation of clean air and water standards might provide citi-
zens with a remedy. 1°
Although Friends of Mammoth did not present the question of
substantive rights, the court commented that if adverse environmental
consequences could be mitigated, the development should not be ap-
proved n.41 The court did hold that the approving agency must prepare
a written statement of the "supportive facts" on which the agency made
its decision. 12 One might infer a substantive effect by combining the
dicta with the holding, and conclude that the impact report should be
the controlling factor when agencies approve private developments.
Guidelines for compliance with CEQA were finally issued on Febru-
ary 3, 1973, more than two years after the Act was passed. 1 This
lethargy, which had given rise to much uncertainty and resulting litiga-
tion and economic loss, could have benefited the environmentalists if
the court's dicta, concerning substantive rights, had been incorporated
into its decision or followed by another court. Unfortunately this was
not done.
One particularly noteworthy issue presented by the guidelines is
whether the word "environment" should be limited to physical conditions
as suggested in section 21060.5. In the cover letter transmitting the
guidelines, the Secretary for Resources pointed out that section 21083 (c),
408. See section III, A, 3 supra.
409. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
410. See section III note 298 supra and accompanying text.
411. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 262 n.8, 502 P.2d 1049,
1059 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 n.8 (1972).
412. Id. at 270, 502 P.2d at 1065, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
413. Guidelines for Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act of
1970, were issued by the Resources Agency of California on Feb. 3, 1973.
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which spoke of adverse effects on human beings, and section 21100(g),
dealing with growth-inducing impacts, indicated that the legislature did
not intend to limit "environment" to physical effects. The probable re-
sult of this construction will be that courts will require future environ-
mental impact reports to contain a cost-benefit analysis which balances
the socio-economic benefits of a development against the adverse effects
on human beings because of damage done to the physical environment.
Thus, consideration of the environment is perhaps the principal benefit
of NEPA-type statutes, but this benefit must also be weighed against
the socio-economic costs of the legislation before its true value or effec-
tiveness can be determined.
B. Florida's Regulatory Problem
Florida, with its extensive coastline and wetlands, its incredible
population growth and development, and its continuing water problem,
is long overdue for effective land-use and enlightened environmental
legislation. Hopefully, the Florida legislators will be able to learn from
the experiences of other states as well as from the federal environmental
legislation and eventually adopt what will be the model for environ-
mental legislation in years to come.
Perhaps Florida's concern for pollution control and environmental
quality can best be illustrated by the fact that over two hundred bills
concerning ecological problems were considered by the 1971 sessions of
the Florida legislature.414 Of these, thirty were passed415 and they ranged
from the permit powers of the Pollution Control Department 416 to junk-
yard control417 and regulations on stone crabs. 1
Article II, section 7 of the Florida Constituiton clearly establishes
Florida's policy to conserve and protect natural resources and scenic
beauty, and to abate air, water, and noise pollution. In spite of the sim-'
plicity of this charge, there is a tremendous proliferation and fragmen-
tation of the responsibility for enforcing the varied, complex, and over-
lapping regulations. For example:
(1) Florida Statutes, chapter 403 charges the Pollution Control
Department with a permit function in the areas of air and
water pollution,41 9 ocean outfall or disposal wells for sani-
tary sewage disposal ° or industrial waste treatment,42'
and the importation of aquatic plants or seeds.422
414. Preliminary Staff Study for the Florida Subcommittee on Environmental Affairs
and National Resources Management, at 10 (Aug. 1971).
415. Id.
416. FLA. STAT. § 403.087 (1973).
417. FLA. STAT. § 339.241 (1973).
418. FIA. STAT. § 370.13 (1973).
419. FLA. STAT. § 403.061(13) (1973).
420. FLA. STAT. § 403.085(1) (1973).
421. FLA. STAT. § 403.085 (1973).
422. FLA. STAT. § 403.271 (1973).
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(2) The Natural Resources Department and its division of in-
terior resources are charged with a permit function for any
coastal construction,428 for construction and operation of
certain types of canals,424 for drilling or exploring for oil,4 25
for extracting minerals from the land,420 for operating a
terminal facility, 27 and for dredge or fill activities; 428 and
the department has the responsibility of organizing flood
control districts and establishing water levels in all state
waters. 29
(3) The Transportation Department is charged with preserv-
ing and enhancing the environment and conserving natural
resources including scenic, historical and recreation assets
through proper planning of transportation facilities. 8 °
(4) The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund is charged with a permit function for any construc-
tion of islands or extension of lands bordering on or in
navigable waters in the state,4 1 and for any extraction of
minerals, timber, water 482 or petroleum 43 from state land.
The foregoing is but a brief sample of the myriad of agencies and
statutory provisions that attempt to further the state's environmental
policy as set out in the constitution. The status of effectiveness of Flori-
da's complex regulatory system is further burdened by additional com-
plications introduced by the overlapping regulations administered by
each of the different agencies.
On the brighter side, Florida has recently made some very important
but long-overdue policy decisions for effective land development regu-
lations.48 4
1. THE FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL LAND AND WATER
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972
The most notable step forward was the enactment of The Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972.485 The Act
423. FLA. STAT. § 370.02(2) (d) (1973), and FLA. STAT. § 161.041 (1973).
424. FLA. STAT. § 373.194(1) (1973), and FLA. STAT. § 374.051(1) (1973).
425. FLA. STAT. § 377.242(1) (1973).
426. FLA. STAT. § 377.242(2) (1973).
427. FLA. STAT. § 376.06(1) (1973).
428. FLA. STAT. § 370.033 (1973).
429. FLA. STAT. § 378.01 (1973).
430. FLA. STAT. § 334.02 (1973).
431. FLA. STAT. § 253.124(1) (1973).
432. FLA. STAT. § 253.45(1) (1973).
433. FLA. STAT. § 253.47 (1973).
434. Address by Ernest R. Bartley, AIP Planning Consultant to the Florida Environ-
mental Land Management Study Committee, ELMS Committee Miami Mariott meeting,
June 11, 1973. In Mr. Bartley's absence, Mr. Daniel O'Connell, Executive Director of the
ELMS Committee, read the address.
435. Fla. Stat. § 380.012 et seq. (1973).
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declares that the state has proper concerns in land development and that
the state will accept its responsibility to guide growth and development
in order to protect the environment of the state."'
Florida's approach to the problem of environmental protection
under this Act is different from the NEPA-type statutes. It focuses on
the "positive goal of proposing land development regulations and a land
resource management system which encourages environmental protec-
tion consistent with a sound economic pattern of well planned develop-
ment.'
43 7
The Act establishes an administrative commission, a state land
planning agency,489 and regional planning agencie 440 to administer its
provisions. The state land planning agency may recommend to the ad-
ministrative commission specific areas of critical state concern. 41 Once
land is designated as such, no person can undertake a development
there,442 unless approval is given by the local government. 443 However,
before approval the local government must insure that the development
complies with the land development regulations for the area.4 44 Before
this statute developments had to be submitted and approved by the state
land planning agency.4 4
5
If a developer wishes to begin a project in an area not of critical
state concern, the Act wil not affect him unless the development will be
one of regional impact.446 These developments are defined as "any de-
velopment which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would
have a substantial effect upon the health, safety or welfare of citizens of
more than one county. ' 447 The guidelines, which will be discussed later,
outline several types of developments with regional impact,448 and pro-
vide that if a developer is in doubt, he may request a binding letter of
interpretation from the state land planning agency.449 If the development
is one of regional impact, section 380.06(5)-(11) sets forth a procedure
that must be followed if the developer wishes to undertake the project.
It is noteworthy that these procedures require the regional planning
agency to prepare and submit to the local government a report with
recommendations on the regional impact of the proposed development.80
436. Id.
437. Fla. ELMS Comm., Interim Rep. to the Fla. Legis., at 5 (March 1973).
438. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(1) (1973).
439. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1973).
440. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1973).
441. FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1973).
442. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(13) (1973).
443. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10) (1973).
444. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(10) (1973).
445. FLA. STAT. § 380.05(5) (1973).
446. FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1973).
447. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1973).
448. See Rules, Fla. Admin. Comm'n 22F-1.01 and 22F-2.01 to .12 March 7, 1973),
effective July 1, 1973, implementing Fla. Stat. §§ 380.04, .06, and .10 (Supp. 1972).
449. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(4) (a) (1973).
450. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1973).
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This report is analogous to an environmental impact statement in that
the regional agency must consider the impact on the environment,45' the
economy, 52 water availability and waste disposal,45 public transporta-
tion facilities,4 54 and availability of housing.4 55 Since the burden of pre-
paring the report is on the regional planning agency 456 rather than the
developer, perhaps it is more analogous to NEPA than to CEQA. How-
ever, there does seem to be some room for an interpretation that would
allow the agency to charge the applicant reasonable costs for its prepara-
tion.
457
Once the report is submitted to the local government, that agency
must consider the extent to which the development: (1) unreasonably
interferes with the objectives of the state land development plan; (2) is
consistent with the local land development plan; and (3) is consistent
with the report and recommendations of the regional land planning
agency.4 15 Although the local government may approve a development
contrary to the recommendations contained in the regional agency's re-
port, section 380.07(11) could be used to give a much more substantive
effect to the impact report than that provided in the California statute.
In other words, the courts could impose a duty on the local agency to
consider the report on the regional impact in good faith. Thus the courts
could effectively achieve what the Friends of Mammoth court suggested
in dicta, to prohibit approval of any development if the adverse environ-
mental consequences could be mitigated.459
It should also be noted that Florida Statutes section 380 (1973)
also provides for a speedy administrative appeal of the local orders to
the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (the governor
and cabinet), which has the power to override such an order. Although
there is a movement to limit the review to denying such orders, as the
provision currently stands, the commission has the power to require siting
of unpopular but regionally beneficial and necessary projects such as
nuclear power plants, low cost housing and industrial plants.
The Act also created an Environmental Land Management Study
Committee (ELMS).46° This committee was charged with the responsi-
bility of studying
all facets of land resource management and land development
regulation with a view toward insuring that Florida's land use
451. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(a) (1973).
452. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(b) (1973).
453. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(c) (1973).
454. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(d) (1973).
455. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8)(e) (1973).
456. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1973).
457. Id. This inference could be drawn by a court because the Act makes no reference
as to who should bear the cost.
458. FLA. STAT. § 380.07(11)(a)-(c) (1973).
459. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
460. FLA. STAT. § 380.09(1) (1973).
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laws give the highest quality of human amenities and environ-
mental protection consistent with a sound and economic pat-
tern of well planned development, and shall recommend such
new legislation or amendments to existing legislation as are
needed to achieve that goal.46
The ELMS committee was additionally charged with the duty
under Florida Statutes section 380.09(5) (Supp. 1972) of submitting
a report to the governor and legislature, covering, inter alia, review of
other relevant state-commissioned studies and reports. Although not
specifically delegated the duty, the ELMS committee, in conjunction
with the state land planning agency, prepared the initial standards and
guidelines which were adopted by the administrative commission" 2 and
approved by the legislature on March 7, 1973.463
2. ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA ACT
In analyzing the ultimate weaknesses and strengths of the Florida
approach, the key will be the performance of the ELMS committee and
how forcefully it can present its conclusions and recommendations to the
legislature.
At the initial meeting of the ELMS committee in June 1972, the
Governor put forth a challenge to the community to show Florida how
the state can continue to enjoy solid economic growth and at the same
time preserve and enhance its unique natural resources. He stressed the
positive purpose of the committee "to encourage environmental protection
consistent with a sound and economic pattern of well-planned develop-
ment.,, 4
64
But even with such a broad charge, several weaknesses have be-
come apparent. Although the Act was extremely liberal in its definition
of what types of activities are included in the term "development, '"465
ELMS was severely restrictive in defining the very vital concept of what
developments were to be presumed to have a regional impact.46 6 For ex-
ample, only twelve different types of developments are listed in the
guidelines as developments of regional impact,467 and for one reason or
another, no mention was made as to whether the list of twelve was in-
clusive or not. Quite possibly, the courts will treat the twelve as all in-
clusive.
Even though the list purports to contain developments of regional
461. FLA. STAT. § 380.09(2) (1973).
462. As required by FLA. STAT. § 380.06(2) (1973).
463. As required by FLA. STAT. § 380.10(1) (1973).
464. The Fla. ELMS Comm., Interim Rep. to Governor, at 1 (Dec. 1972).
465. FLA. STAT. § 380.04 (1973).
466. See Rules, Fla. Admin. Comm'n 22F-2.01 to .12 (March 7, 1973).
467. The developments listed in Rules, Fla. Admin. Comm'n 22F-2.01 to .12 (March 7,
1973), include such developments as airports, electrical generating facilities, hospitals, and
petroleum storage facilities.
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impact, the standards were set at such a high level that developers (other
than Disney) can work around them easily. For example the list includes
residential developments.46 Yet, under ELMS standards, in counties
such as Dade with population in excess of 500,000, only developments
of 3,000 dwelling units or more are considered to be developments of
regional impact.69 It would certainly behoove a developer to limit his
development to 2,999 units, because the committee has declared that
there will be no substantial regional effect below 3,000 units. When
questioned on this conservative position taken by the committee, Mr.
Daniel O'Connell, Executive Director of ELMS, responded that the levels
were set high to give the responsible agencies some experience until
proper financing and staffing is provided at the regional levels.4 7 ° Per-
haps a more candid answer would have been that land use planning is
policy and policy cannot be divorced from politics.' 1 It may be naive
to hope that the committee members will be able to rise above the back-
room elements of politics, but if they do not, their credibility and effec-
tiveness with the legislature will be of marginal value. Possible evidence
of their effectiveness to date was the response received in a request for
funding. The committee recommended that the regional agencies be
funded to the level of 1.2 million dollars. The legislature only provided
$450,000.00.472
Consequently, the regional planning agencies which have the re-
sponsibility of preparing the environmental impact reports, must begin
work understaffed and short of funds. Perhaps Daniel O'Connell's re-
sponse, that the definitions of what were developments of regional im-
pact were restrictively set to give experience until proper financing was
provided, will prove to be a fortunate decision.
Even though the effectiveness of Florida's Environmental Land and
Water Management Act will depend primarily upon the effectiveness of
ELMS, the Act itself has several apparent weaknesses from the view-
point of an environmentalist.
First, the Act has no provision that guarantees standing to private
citizens or groups to challenge the decision of state or local agencies,
even where a serious irreversible environmental effect will occur. The
legislature may have relied on the provisions of the Florida Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1971 to provide standing. 73 However, that Act
468. Rules, Fla. Admin. Comm'n 22F-2.10 (March 7, 1973).
469. Id.
470. This response was given by Mr. O'Connell during a public question and answer
discussion period at the ELMS Committee meeting at the Miami Mariott Hotel, June 12,
1973.
471. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZoniNo GAaE (1966); See generally Hagman, Race, Poverty,
and Planning and Development Control Law: Past, Present and Future, in URBAN PLAN-
NING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 470 (1971).
472. Address by Allan Milledge, Chairman of the ELMS Committee, ELMS Committee
Miami Mariott meeting, June 11, 1973.
473. FLA. STAT. § 403.412 (1973).
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may be of no benefit to private citizens as an effective device to get a
court to weigh environmental costs against the developers' right to de-
velop if the local approving agency has actually considered the regional
agencies report and recommendations, 4 74 since it provides that the doc-
trine of res judicata shall apply.475 Thus, even though private citizens
have a right to intervene prior to the agency's decision, it seems that if
the local agency adhered to the procedural steps of Florida Statutes
chapter 380 and awarded a permit, citizens would have no cause of
action under the Environmental Protection Act of 1971.
Whether or not this conclusion is correct, the Florida legislature
should clarify the ambiguous relationship between chapters 380 and
403.412 of the Florida Statutes, so that citizens, developers, and the
courts will understand the rights involved. There seems to be a need for
some degree of certainty other than waiting to see if the courts will give
a substantive effect to the environmental report and require the local
agency to follow the regional agency's recommendations.
The uncertainty of the present statute has definite economic costs
that should be considered by the legislature. However, such costs are
beyond the scope of this paper. It must be noted that some efforts were
made by the draftsmen of the Florida Act of 197247 to give a
higher degree of certainty than NEPA or CEQA. For example, section
380.06(4) (a) allows a developer to request a binding letter of interpre-
tation if he is in doubt whether his development will be one of regional
impact. On its face a Florida developer appears to be in a more favor-
able position than a California developer or one who comes under NEPA.
However, Federal Securities Law provides for a similar device which is
scarcely used, since even if a favorable ruling is rendered, slight changes
will destroy the binding effect. Therefore, unless the provision is admin-
istered fairly, and proper safeguards are set up, the legislature has done
little more than throw the poor dog a bone.
C. Significant Developments in Other States
The Maine Site Location and Development Law4 77 requires devel-
opers of tracts with more than 20 acres in area to notify the state's En-
vironmental Improvement Commission before commencing construction
or operation.4 78 The theory behind the law is that because sizable de-
velopments have a great capacity to do environmental harm if placed
in an improper region, location of a development is too important a de-
cision to be left to a private party who is motivated out of economic
474. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(11)(c) (1973).
475. FLA. STAT. § 403.412(4) (1973).
476. The Florida Environmental Land & Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT.
§ 380.012 et seq. (1973).
477. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973).
478. Id. at § 482.
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considerations alone. Thus, the state, under its police powers, is granted
authority to regulate the placement of large developments. 79 The de-
veloper is charged with the duty of notifying "in writing of his intent
and of the nature and location of the development, together with such
information as the commission may by regulations require."'4 0 Notice
and hearing are provided for in case the commission is not notified and
wishes to proceed against the developer.48'
The major difference between the Maine and Florida Acts lies in
the definition of the size of a project which is large enough to have suf-
ficient potential of environmental harm to justify the intervention of the
government in the decision of where to locate the development. In this
respect, Maine looks to the area to be covered by the project,482 and
Florida concentrates on the number of units to be built.483 It is question-
able whether either standard accomplishes the purpose of subjecting all
potentially damaging projects to governmental review while not subject-
ing small developments to an unnecessary amount of paper work.
The Maine Act was recently upheld as constitutional by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Maine in In Re Spring Valley Development.4 8
4
There the owner of a 92 acre tract of land was ordered, after a hearing
by the Environmental Improvement Commission, to halt development
of a subdivision until it applied for and received approval by the Com-
mission as provided for in the Act.
First, the court found that the Act applied to residential develop-
ments, including the mere subdivisions of lands for the future building
of homes. It then addressed the question of whether the Act was consti-
tutional under the police powers of the state.
It seems self-evident in these times of increased awareness of
the relationship of the environment to human health and wel-
fare that the state may act-if it acts properly- to conserve
the quality of air, soil and water.
To do so the state may justifiably limit the use which some
owners may make of their property...."'
The court then examined whether the state had exercised its author-
ity in a proper manner. It found that the Act was constitutional as ap-
plied to a mere subdivider because the connection between the purpose of
the Act and its applications to the subdivider was clear and reasonable. It
also rejected the developer's argument that to set the threshold for ap-
plication of the Act at 20 acres was a denial of equal protection. The
court did find one part of the Act to be unconstitutional. It said that in
479. In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 749 (Me. 1973).
480. ME. REV. STAT. ANw. tit. 38, § 483 (Supp. 1973).
481. Id.
482. Id. at § 482(2).
483. See note 469 supra and accompanying text.
484. 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
485. Id. at 746.
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determining whether a development would harm the environment, the
commission could not take the possibility of depreciation of property
value into consideration because property value does not have a close
enough connection with the purpose of the Act.
This decision is of some importance because it demonstrates that a
land use planning law does not necessarily have to run afoul of the fifth
amendment. Here, the court rejected the contention that the applica-
tion of the Act to a subdeveloper was a taking without compensation.
However, the only certain effect of the Act in this case was that the land
could not be subdivided and sold according to its present plan without
the approval of the Commission. It would be a different question if the
developer was restrained from developing the land at all. Since taking
is a term of art, it remains to be seen how much the court will allow land
use to be restrained in the name of preserving the environment, without
requiring payment of compensation.
Another example of how a general environmental protection statute
might be applied to a land development was presented in Irish v. Green.48 6
There, a developer was enjoined from building a 745 unit residential
housing project unless three court imposed conditions were met. The
plaintiffs had filed suit under Michigan's Environmental Protection Act
of 1970487 which allows any person or other legal entity to maintain an
action for protection of the state's natural resources.
Here, it was shown that the development, if completed as planned,
would result in pollution of the water supply because of the extraordin-
ary underground flow of water. The court held that if more than 40%
of the development was completed there must be a central sewage and
water supply installed. It also required that an improved access road
would have to be opened to preserve a parallel scenic road that would
otherwise be the only access to the development.
This decision demonstrates the utility of a general purpose environ-
mental law for controlling land-use abuses. Compared with the Cali-
fornia, Florida, and Maine acts outlined above, its operation appears to
be much less complex. First, no government management agency is di-
rectly created by the Act to control land use. This saves the taxpayers
the money required to operate the agency and it also saves developers
the funds needed to hire lawyers to comply with a more elaborate sys-
tem of regulation. Second, land developers are not restricted in choices
of action by bureaucratic guidelines. Thus, the market determines the
use of the land up to the point that an ecologically detrimental proposed
use raises such an adverse reaction that an individual brings suit. The
net effect of such a law should be to impose legal-environmental costs
only on those who actually threaten the environment.
Upon the foregoing analysis one might conclude that the public
486. 4 ENvlR. L. REP. 1404 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Emmet Cty. 1972).
487. MICE. Comp. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 (Supp. 1973-74).
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would be better served by a scheme of environmental laws which would
protect the environment mainly through the authorization of citizen
suits. This analysis, however, is deficient in a number of respects. First,
the cost calculation fails because it does not take into account the possi-
bility that organizations opposed to any kind of growth will bring suit
under color of the statute to enjoin any major development, regardless of
what effect it will have on the land resources involved. Thus, "nuisance"
suits would encompass more developments and generate unnecessary
costs. The second flaw in the analysis is that it does not take into account
the need for uniform action in protecting areas of critical environmental
concern, such as wetlands. This lack of uniformity, where such uni-
formity is needed, is an additional cost to be added to the lawsuit method
of protection. The final shortcoming, which is somewhat tied to the lack
of uniformity, is the uncertainty inherent in a scheme of regulation which
is based on citizen suits. Not only is the developer faced with the possi-
bility of "nuisance" suits, but he is also without a set of standards which
would detail the types of projects to be avoided in a given area so as
to avoid degrading the environment and being subjected to court action.
Obviously, one of the lessons to be learned from the analysis of the
laws discussed above is that a more thorough understanding of the social
and economic effects of environmental legislation is required if the bene-
fits of a legislative system for protecting our land resources is to out-
weigh its costs. Furthermore, a better understanding of the nature of the
problem with which we are dealing must be developed.
V. NATIONAL LAND USE MANAGEMENT-A NEw APPROACH
Two years ago, Russell Train, Chairman of the CEQ, called land
use "the most important environmental issue remaining substantially un-
addressed as a matter of national policy. '48 8 Since that statement was
made, considerable efforts, such as those discussed in the previous sec-
tion, have been made to include land-use regulation as part of the exist-
ing system of environmental controls. Also, several pieces of legislation
have been introduced in Congress,489 and one bill in particular, S. 268,490
has had some success. Sponsored by Senator Jackson and others, the
bill was passed by the Senate in each of the past two years, but failed
to pass the House, presumably because the issues of the limitations im-
posed by the fourteenth amendment and the degree of sanctions to be
imposed for non-compliance by the states were not resolved.
Briefly, the bill would provide for the establishment of a new
agency under the Secretary of the Interior to administer a series of
488. CouNci. oN ENViRONMENTAL QuALrrY, 4th ANNUAL REPORT 122 (1973).
489. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. Doc. No. 7211, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ; H.R. Doc. No. 10294, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
490. S. Doc. No. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a summary of the bill, see 4
ENVIR. L. RE p. CURRENT DEVs. 123 (1973).
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grants-in-aid to the states. The agency would be responsible for making
studies of land resources, developing a standard system for cataloging
such resources, developing a federal land-use information and data cen-
ter, and monitoring the methods adopted by state and local governments
to develop adequate statewide land-use planning processes and subse-
quently land-use programs to meet the requirements for continued eligi-
bility for grants. Basically, the land-use planning process comprises the
action to be taken by states in establishing a permanent program to deal
with the use of their land. The concept of the process is the essence of
the bill and will be examined in detail because it demonstrates the com-
plexity of the considerations which must go into forming a unitary ap-
proach to land management.
First, the process would include the preparation of inventories of
the state's resources, including both its natural resources and its human
resources available for the establishment of management programs. Tied
closely to these inventories are projections of the needs of the state, in-
cluding agricultural, industrial, recreational, transportation, energy and
economic considerations. In other words, a complete study would have
to be made of the supply of all of the state's resources, both natural and
human, and a projection would be made of the total demand from all
sources to be placed on those resources. This shows the recognition by
the drafters of the bill that in order for any management program to be
successful, it must be conducted by people who have an adequate arsenal
of information. In terms of environmental management, this concept has
been too often overlooked in the past. However, it must be realized that
the collection of all of the information specified above will require an
enormous amount of funding. And it must also be realized that if the
bill is eventually passed, and is underfunded, the net result may be that
decisions will be made which are based on incomplete data. Such de-
cisions usually create as many problems as they solve.
The second major element in the process is the development of the
capability to identify environmentally significant resources and to con-
trol proposed actions which pose a threat to those resources. Thus, the
state is required to identify areas of "critical environmental concern"
and must demonstrate that it can, pursuant to its police powers, prevent
all development which threatens the integrity of these areas. Along the
same line, the state must also demonstrate that it has the machinery
available to identify large scale development of more than local impact
and to ensure that such development is not at odds with the state land-
use program. It is the enforcement of these provisions which poses the
fourteenth amendment problem.
The final elements of the process deal with funds for training gov-
ernment personnel to handle the program and for methods of coordinat-
ing the interests of the home state with those of the federal government,
other states, and private interests that are affected by the development
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of the land-use planning process. These provisions ensure that the pro-
grams for federally owned lands will be in harmony with state use of
lands which are contiguous with the federal lands. They also provide a
continuity of land-use patterns between different states, a feature which
is critical if a national land-use management system is to be achieved.
As mentioned before, the land-use planning process is the pro-
cedure of organizing a permanent land management program. The bill
gives the states five years to develop a program which embodies most of
the features of the planning process.
The previous discussion should emphasize the enormous costs in-
volved in implementing a bill having provisions this complex. As might
be expected, it has evoked a great deal of controversy in the Congress.
Senator Jackson described the bill as "the nation's last chance to pre-
serve and invigorate local land use decision-making and insure that basic
property rights are not infringed by bureaucrats in places as far removed
as Washington, D.C." '491 Opponents have said that if enacted, the bill
would be an administrative nightmare, that it would shift too much
power to the federal government, that it would hinder utilization of
underground resources, and that it places too much power in the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, which has a veto power over appropri-
ations if a state's plan is not in accord with EPA goals.492
Every piece of legislation has its proponents and opponents, so the
presence of diverging views is not unique in this case. However, the
nature of the arguments indicates that there are some problems which
should be dealt with before a land management act becomes law. First,
the drafters must be certain that the correct inter-governmental balance
is achieved between federal, state and local units. Otherwise, the regula-
tory input will not balance the desires of the different interest groups
with the need for ecological protection. Second, the drafters should com-
mission a study to determine the optimal procedures for balancing the
resources with social goals. If a hastily drafted bill becomes law, bureau-
cratic shortcomings could prevent those goals from being achieved by
creating an imbalance in input from the various sectors of society having
an interest in the use of a particular resource. It should be remembered
that a land management program will substitute another governmental
control over the free market. Excessive costs involved in the operation
of this control mechanism would certainly aid special interest groups in
emasculating the law and could seriously harm the environmental move-
ment. Environmental laws are already becoming a scapegoat for the
energy crisis, but a poorly drafted land management bill has the capa-
city of causing even greater outcry. This country has a much stronger
heritage of private ownership and use of land than it does in the owner-
ship of the family automobile.




Effective land management will involve a combination of federal,
state, and local controls in order to minimize regulatory costs and maxi-
mize protection and efficient use of resources. To accomplish this coop-
eration, it is necessary to fully understand the management role of each
governmental unit. After this is understood, it will then be necessary to
repeal old laws and redistribute traditional government functions in ac-
cordance with the master plan.
To this end, it appears that the proper role for the federal govern-
ment in land management is twofold. First, it should set up very broad
guidelines for states to follow in organizing their land-use programs.
Second, it should perform those functions such as data collection and
regional coodination which are more efficiently performed by a govern-
mental unit having broad powers. Thus, a land-use management bill
considered by Congress should include provisions which consolidate the
land-use functions of all other federal laws related to pollution, federal
lands, energy, transportation, and procedure. From the framework of
these existing laws, and other primarily federal considerations, guidelines
should be issued which require the states to operate their land manage-
ment programs in harmony with these objectives.
Each state should be required to have one governmental unit re-
sponsible for all aspects of land-use management including conservation
of natural resources, overall housing and building standards, and all
licensing functions related to land use. This agency should have the
power to institute regional planning to coordinate multi-county areas
affected, and to control those projects which have more than a local im-
pact. Of utmost importance would be the power to protect areas of criti-
cal environmental concern by limiting or completely prohibiting develop-
ment, or by setting maximum population densities in certain regions.
However, if the areas of critical environmental concern were immediately
identified, developers would be forewarned and future developments
could be placed in such a way to minimize the impact on these areas.
While there would be the temporary cost of dealing with the taking as-
pect of the fourteenth amendment, this cost will be outweighed in the
long run by public information made available by the state which will
aid the private section to plan more efficiently.
The largest impact of a statewide oriented land-use management
program will be felt on the local level of government because many tra-
ditional functions will be curtailed or severely restricted. For example,
the presence of a zoning type power in a state agency will probably cur-
tail zoning by local government to some extent for the sake of con-
sistency. Ideally, local zoning as it now operates should end for a variety
of reasons. First, it has usually failed to preserve the integrity of a
neighborhood as variances have been granted and non-conforming uses
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tolerated where expediency permitted. Second, because of changing eco-
nomic conditions, the early plans have become outdated and require
revision. Thus, it can probably be said that zoning has had much less
to do with the use of land than market forces, and in fact has added a
cost which has probably outweighed any benefits. As to protection of
environmental and aesthetic values, local zoning will no longer be needed
if there is a proper state land-use program.
Aside from the zoning question, which will probably arouse a great
deal of political controversy, the local government should still perform
a variety of functions. It should perform ministerial administration of
a centralized code which dispenses all federal and state permits, includ-
ing but not limited to building, dredge and fill, sewage disposal, bridge
and road construction, and utility connections. It should also perform a
quasi-zoning function by controlling population density in certain areas
for the purpose of maintaining adequate water supplies, open space,
roads and other utilities.
A final consideration which would greatly affect local government
is a change in the tax structure. The property tax has been attacked as
being an incentive for municipalities to encourage uses of the land which
tend to raise the value of land and hence the tax base. This form of
incentive can have adverse environmental consequences because open
space, pathland, and aesthetic considerations are not as appealing as
land use for business and industry. While the end result of complete
development is a higher income, there can be an appreciable decrease
in the quality of life without the presence of land which is unused in
the tax sense. Perhaps if the property tax were replaced with graduated
state income tax, the same amount of money could be raised and distrib-
uted to local government to fund the same functions as is done by the
property tax.
Effective land-use management is not a matter of choice, but a
necessity if the quality of life is to be maintained and our natural re-
sources conserved. At no time in the past has there been the inherent
necessity and capacity for society to create such enormous changes in
the use of land in such a short period of time. If these actions are not
controlled in an orderly and rational manner, irreplaceable natural re-
sources will be lost, and the loss will not be fully realized until it is too
late. State and federal land-use management programs will require an
adjustment by individuals and may, in their infancy, slow the rate of
growth in certain areas of the economy. Those who think that this cost
is too great should ponder the risk of proceeding in the same haphazard,
unorganized manner in which we have been operating. Prime farmland
is among the natural resources endangered by rampant development.
How much can we safely afford to pave over and still meet the demand
for food thirty years from now?
